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ARE FEDERAL EXONEREES PAID?:
LESSONS FOR THE DRAFTING AND
INTERPRETATION OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION
COMPENSATION STATUTES
JEFFREY S. GUTMAN*
ABSTRACT
In this third of a series of articles on wrongful conviction compensation statutes,
Professor Jeffrey Gutman tackles the first statute attempted to be passed in the United
States – the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute. Championed in concept
by Edwin Borchard, it was in fact poorly drafted, and recommendations by Attorney
General Homer Cummings to improve it were only partly successful. This Article
retraces the long legislative history of the statute which is dotted with sloppy language
and reasoning, unexplained amendments and an unfortunate focus on who was not to
benefit from it, rather than who was. This tangled legislative history has resulted in
two lines of cases, which either interpret it and the statute faithfully with poor results
or rebel against it yielding better results as a matter of policy, but with dubious
statutory support.
Based on his empirical research, Professor Gutman reveals that of 118 people
listed in the National Registry of Exonerations as having been exonerated of federal
crimes, only two have been awarded compensation under it. He demonstrates that a
combination of unnecessary and ill-considered statutory language and an overreading
of the legislative history have yielded results unmoored from Professor Borchard’s
modest vision of the statute.
Professor Gutman argues that the often-misread legislative history’s concern about
compensating those whose convictions were set aside on technical or procedural
grounds has led several courts to misconceive the plaintiff’s burden of showing their
innocence. This manner of approaching the question of innocence, what Professor
Gutman calls “room thinking” requires petitioners to disprove all evidence of guilt –
the grounds upon which there remains “room” for concluding that the exoneree may
still be guilty. He contends that this approach is inconsistent with the established
preponderance of the evidence standard and should be replaced by a familiar burden
shifting analysis that will result in more balanced judicial decision-making in difficult
cases.
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Last, Professor Gutman explores a petition for a certificate of innocence litigated
in Wisconsin which provides a unique opportunity to stress-test each of the three
principal prongs of the statute. The result of that successful petition, which could have
foundered on any of the required prongs, is surprising. Examination of that case and a
comparison to state wrongful conviction compensation statutes, results in Professor
Gutman’s concrete proposals for the amendment of the statute and its administration
truer to the visions of Borchard and Cummings.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2019 decision by the Justice Department to reinstate the federal death penalty1
and the subsequent spate of executions carried out by the Trump administration2 have
refocused attention on federal exonerees – those people who have been exonerated of
federal crimes for which they were wrongly convicted. In contrast to those exonerated
of state crimes, many of whom have received far more press coverage, exposure on
podcasts, TV shows, movies and academic attention,3 federal exonerees remain a
largely invisible group.
The National Registry of Exonerations4 lists 118 exonerees who were wrongfully
convicted of federal crimes and exonerated since 1989.5 Apart from former CIA agent
Edwin Wilson, who was wrongfully convicted of exporting explosives to Libya,6 and
former Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, whose convictions for failing to report gifts

1 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Federal Government to Resume Capital Punishment After
Nearly Two Decade Lapse (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federalgovernment-resume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decade-lapse
[https://perma.cc/RR3F-WGLD]; see Roane v. Barr (In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ & Execution
Protocol Cases), 955 F.3d 106, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Bourgeois v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 180,
180 (2020) (mem.).
2 Michael Tarm & Michael Kunzelman, Trump Administration Carries out 13th and Final
Execution, AP NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-wildlifecoronavirus-pandemic-crime-terre-haute-28e44cc5c026dc16472751bbde0ead50
[https://perma.cc/75Y2-BGPF]; Aris Foley, Federal Government Carries out 13th and Final
(Jan.
16,
2021,
8:32
AM),
Execution
Under
Trump,
HILL
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/534555-federal-government-carries-out-13thand-final-execution-under-trump [https://perma.cc/9STV-9CZC]; Madeleine Carlisle, In a Year
Marked by Death, the Trump Administration Cements a Legacy of Unprecedented Executions,
TIME (Dec. 30, 2020, 9:48 AM), https://time.com/5923973/trump-executions-death-penaltycovid-19/ [https://perma.cc/NST7-DGSC].
3 Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the
Wrongly Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV. 369, 437 (2017); Jeffrey S. Gutman & Lingxiao Sun, Why
Is Mississippi the Best State in Which to Be Exonerated? An Empirical Evaluation of State
Statutory and Civil Compensation for the Wrongfully Convicted, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 694, 696
(2019); Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate
Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703,
711 (2004); Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly
Convicted: What Works, What Doesn't and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 415 (2009).
4
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EJC5ZWCV]. The data set forth in this Article is accurate as of January 1, 2021.
5 Six were convicted in a military tribunal and are excluded from this analysis. This number
compares to 2,588 exonerees wrongfully convicted in state court as of January 1, 2021.
6 Maurice Possley, Edwin Wilson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3452
[https://perma.cc/4DBP-DGRZ] (last updated Sept. 11, 2015).
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were set aside,7 this group of exonerees is little known because, on the whole, their
stories are less compelling. They average 2.5 years of imprisonment, compared to 9.4
years for state exonerees.8 Forty-five never served time at all; forty-eight were
wrongly convicted of white-collar crimes.9 Only six were convicted of murder or
sexual assault.10 Just one was exonerated as a result of DNA analysis.11
Yet, analysis of federal exonerees teaches important lessons about the drafting and
interpretation of the statute intended to compensate them. The history of the federal
wrongful conviction compensation statute dates back to 1912 and stands as the first
effort, state or federal, to pass such a statute in the United States.12 That initial effort
was unsuccessful, but a statute authorizing $5,000 in compensation for wrongful
conviction and subsequent incarceration was passed in 1938.13 Since then, the statute
has served as a model for some parallel state statutes that award compensation to those
wrongly convicted in state court.
The crafting of wrongful conviction compensation statutes begins with a
conception of those who are “deserving.” The drafting challenge is to create a process
and a set of standards to ensure that those deemed deserving are always and quickly
compensated while precluding compensation for those regarded as undeserving. The
first champion of wrongful conviction compensation, Edwin Borchard, offered a
modest notion of the “deserving”14 and, even so, his 1912 draft of the statute failed
that challenge. His poorly worded statute was virtually impossible to satisfy.
In Part II of this Article, I trace the lengthy history of the federal wrongful
conviction compensation statute, which owes its passage to Borchard, and the bizarre
wrongful murder conviction of a Hungarian immigrant who received post-exoneration
financial support from an unusual source. While Borchard receives appropriate credit
as the father of the statute, it was actually FDR’s Attorney General, Homer Cummings,
who had a more clear-eyed understanding of how it might work in practice. Congress’
failure to adopt Cummings’ suggestions on how to improve the statute continues to
plague it.

7 Maurice Possley, Ted Stevens, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 2012),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3663
[https://perma.cc/RDB5-BD2S].
8 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912).
13 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, 52 Stat. 438 (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513); see Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice,
21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201 (1941).
14 Borchard himself used the terms “deserving” and “undeserving.” EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62974, at 14 (1912).
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In Part III, I show that, perhaps not coincidentally, only two federal exonerees
listed in the National Registry have received compensation under the statute. In Part
IV, I return to Borchard’s original concept and highlight the flaws in the drafting of
the statute. While the statute took over two decades to pass, the key explanations of
its language and purpose are set forth in brief and, in part, illogical passages of the
legislative history. Ill-conceived language combined with this tangled legislative
history have led to two distinct and conflicting approaches to the interpretation of the
statute.
The first interpretation adheres closely to the text of the statute and yields results
unfavorable to plaintiffs, and outcomes unmoored from even Borchard’s modest
conception of the statute’s appropriate scope. The second interpretation bristles
against restrictive text and results in outcomes better as a matter of policy, but dubious
as a matter of statutory interpretation. Changes to the language of the statute can
resolve some of these issues, but I argue that there is a deeper problem in play that is
not susceptible to a solution through redrafting.
I contend that an overreading of the statute’s legislative history has led to
interpretations that rest on the statute’s presumed narrowness rather than its
humanitarian purpose. The clearest manifestation of this approach lies in courts’
assessments of the most important statutory requirement – whether a plaintiff has
demonstrated their innocence. Several courts have implicitly departed from a standard
that requires the plaintiff to show their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Instead, they have adopted what I call “room thinking,” in which they seize on pieces
of inculpatory evidence and the plaintiff’s failure to refute all evidence of guilt. With
“room” to conclude that they may be guilty, these courts deny the requests for a
certificate of innocence that is required for compensation.
In Part V, I highlight these statutory and interpretive issues by discussing the
obscure case of Mhummad Abu-Shawish, the director of a non-profit, who had hoped
to redevelop a stretch of Milwaukee’s Muskego Avenue and ended up serving three
years in prison. Abu-Shawish has remarkably overcome both statutory and interpretive
barriers in his quest for a certificate of innocence. In Part VI, I offer thoughts on how
cases like that of Abu-Shawish suggest changes to the language of the statute and to
approaches to its interpretation and implementation in a manner that redeems
Professor Borchard’s and Attorney General Cummings’ vision of the federal wrongful
conviction compensation statute and its state counterparts.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WRONGFUL CONVICTION COMPENSATION
STATUTE
A. 1912
In 1911, a wrongful conviction splashed across the newspaper headlines of the
day. Andrew Toth, a Hungarian immigrant and steelworker in one of Andrew
Carnegie’s mills, was exonerated of a murder that occurred in the mill during labor
unrest.15 Another man, coincidentally also named Toth, belatedly admitted to the
crime on his death bed in Hungary.16 The whole Toth saga would likely never have
15 Carnegie Pensions Toth. Man Who Served Twenty Years for Crime He Did Not Commit,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1911, at 1.
16 David J. Krajicek, Andrew Carnegie’s Iron Grip of Greed – The Saga of ‘Praying Andy’
Toth, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2010), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/andrew-
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come to light were it not for Carnegie’s well-publicized decision to provide Toth, who
returned to Hungary after his exoneration, a $40 per month pension when the
Pennsylvania legislature refused to compensate him.17
A proposal for a federal wrongful conviction compensation statute quickly
followed in 1912 when the British-born Senator George Sutherland of Utah, who later
served for nearly sixteen years as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, introduced a bill for “Relief of Persons Erroneously Convicted.”18 The bill and
accompanying report was drafted by Edwin Borchard, then the Law Librarian of the
Library of Congress and leading early advocate for wrongful conviction
compensation.19
Borchard’s 1912 report was called “State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal
Justice,”20 and was, as we will see, excerpted in subsequent legislative reports through
the 1930s. In the first sentence of the report he noted, “[i]n an age when social justice
is the watchword of legislative reform, it is strange that society, at least in this country,
utterly disregards the plight of the innocent victim of unjust conviction or detention in
criminal cases.”21
The report is principally a survey of how European countries have “solved the
problem of indemnifying those innocent individuals who, in the exercise of a
sovereign right beneficial to society and to the State in its function as the preserver of

carnegie-iron-grip-greed-saga-praying-andy-toth-article-1.440757
2324].

[https://perma.cc/NYC7-

17 Andrew Carnegie’s apparent generosity should be viewed in historic context. Toth, like
many Hungarians, worked at Carnegie’s J. Edgar Thomson Steelworks in Pittsburgh.
Conditions were poor and wages were low. And, the steelworkers were required to work on
Christmas Day, 1890. When the Hungarians staged a walk out on New Year’s Day, their places
were taken by Irish workers. A riot ensued when the Hungarian workers marched on the factory.
An Irish supervisor, Michael Quinn, was killed. A witness was led down a line of Hungarian
workers, picked out two claimed to have assaulted Quinn, and when he came to Toth, Toth
laughed at him. The witness then accused Toth of involvement in the assault. Following a trial
conducted in English, a language that the Hungarian workers did not understand, the three were
convicted and sentenced to death. Carnegie persuaded the Governor to commute the sentences
to life imprisonment. In 1910, a dying man in Hungary named Stephen Toth, who fled the
United States immediately after the riot, admitted that he participated in the murder. Based on
that confession, the Governor freed Andrew Toth. Id. For more on the Toth/Carnegie case, see
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATION,
Rob
Warden,
Andrew
Toth,
NAT’L
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=334
[https://perma.cc/T9QV-N7T6].
18 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912).
19 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); see also Lawrence
Bluestone, Unjust Imprisonment Claims Before the Court of Federal Claims: The Presentation
of a Certificate of Innocence Should Not Be Considered “Jurisdictional,” 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 221,
223–24 (2011).
20 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO.
62-974 (1912).
21 Id. at 5.
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the public peace, have been unjustly arrested, detained, or convicted and punished.”22
Borchard’s review of those statutes indicated that compensation in Europe was strictly
limited to those who “deserve it.”23 But, there was no clear agreement on what that
meant.
Borchard found that some countries compensated persons who were arrested,
detained, and released without having been convicted of a crime.24 Others
compensated those who were acquitted after trial.25 Still others required an acquittal
after appeal of a conviction.26 Some, but by no means all, additionally required a
showing of innocence of the crimes for which they were charged.27 Borchard
mentioned the approaches of Sweden and Hungary in particular:
In Hungary and in Sweden in case of unjust detention pending trial [one
claiming innocence] must show any one of three things: First, in both
countries, the act for which he is held has not been committed. Second, in
Hungary, that the accused has not committed it; in Sweden, that its author
was another than the accused. Third, in Sweden, that from all the
circumstances it could not have been committed by him; in Hungary, that
while committed by him it was not in a legal sense a punishable act.28
Borchard’s proposal, set forth at the end of his report,29 was essentially identical
to the 1912 bill introduced in the Senate. It was clearly more limited than most of the
European models he studied, requiring both a wrongful conviction and a showing of
innocence.30 He adopted language similar to his description of the statutes in Sweden
and Hungary.31
The 1912 Senate bill first focused on the standard for showing wrongful conviction
and framed it in terms of crimes.32 It permitted those who were convicted of a federal
crime but who, after appeal or retrial, were found “innocent,” of the charged crime
“and not guilty of any other offense against the United States,” to apply for

22 Id. at 6.
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id. at 11–12.
25 Id. at 15.
26 Id. at 11–12.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 15–16. Borchard found Hungary’s approach interesting; it required compensation for
those found not guilty after wrongful conviction and permitted compensation for those unjustly
detained prior to trial who could prove innocence. Id. at 16.
29 Id. at 31–33.
30 Id. at 31.
31 Id. at 32.
32 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912).
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“indemnification for the pecuniary injury he has sustained through his erroneous
conviction and imprisonment.”33 The cap on damages was $5,000.34
Then, the bill turned to the standard of showing innocence and focused on an
“act.”35 When proceeding in the Court of Claims, claimants had the burden of proving
their innocence by “show[ing] that the act with which he was charged was not
committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the accused.”36 Last, “the
claimant must show that he has not, by his acts or failure to act, either intentionally or
by willful misconduct or negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or
conviction.”37
A parallel House bill was also introduced in 1912 and was virtually identical to the
Senate version except for one curious difference, substituting an “or” for the italicized
“and” above.38 The House bill allowed those who were convicted of a charged federal
crime to seek compensation if they were, after appeal, retrial, or rehearing, “found to
have been innocent of the crime for which he was charged or of any other offense
against the United States.”39 Both bills died in committee and no effort to pass a federal
wrongful conviction compensation statute was made for over twenty years.40
B. 1935–1938
The predecessor to today’s federal wrongful conviction compensation statute was
introduced in the Senate in 1935 by Senator Francis Maloney of Connecticut.41 Senate

33 Id. § 1 (emphasis added). In full, the section read: “That any person who, having been
convicted of any crime or offense against the United States shall hereafter, on appeal from the
judgment of conviction or on the retrial or rehearing of his case, be found to have been innocent
of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense against the United
States . . . may, under the conditions hereinafter mentioned, apply by petition for
indemnification for the pecuniary injury he has sustained through his erroneous conviction and
imprisonment.” Id. This “not guilty of any other offense” requirement is written broadly enough
to require claimants to identify a finding that that they had never committed any federal crime,
whether or not related to the crime for which they were wrongly convicted. The impossible
breadth of this requirement was fixed in the bill ultimately passed in 1938.
34 Id. § 9.
35 Id. § 4–5.
36 Id. § 4.
37 Id. § 5.
38 H.R. 26748, 62d Cong. § 1 (1912).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 See Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 734 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). That 1912 effort closely coincided with the
passage of state compensation statutes in Wisconsin, see Act of May 8, 1913, ch. 189, 1913
Wis. Sess. Laws 196, 196–98, and California, see Act of May 24, 1913, ch. 165, 1913 Cal. Stat.
245, 245–46; see also Shelley Fite, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned: A Model for
Reform in Wisconsin, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1182 nn.1–4 (2005).
41 S. 2155, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 2961 (1935).
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Bill 2155 was nearly identical to the Borchard-drafted 1912 Senate bill. It required, in
Section 1, that the claimant show that after appeal, retrial, or rehearing, he had been
“found innocent of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other
offense against the United States.”42 Borchard’s 1912 report explained that the latter
requirement is “used to cover cases where the indictment may fail on the original
count, but claimant may yet be guilty of another or a minor offense.43 Therefore, if
the accused has committed any offense against the United States, his right to relief is
barred.”44
The bill contemplated that the claimant would offer testimony and evidence to the
Court of Claims.45 Like the 1912 bills, the burden was placed in Section 4 on the
claimant to also prove his innocence, requiring him to “show that the act with which
he was charged was not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by the
accused.”46 Borchard did not intend this to be easy: “only a most flagrant case of
injustice could be brought within the terms of this section.”47 The claimant would also
have to show that “he has not, either intentionally or by willful misconduct or
negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.”48
Unlike the 1912 bills, incarceration was not required to obtain indemnification,49
but the maximum amount the claimant could obtain was still only $5,000.50 The only
apparent rationale for that figure lies in Borchard’s 1912 report: “[t]his provision is to
limit any exorbitant claims which may be brought.”51 The bill thus combined both
rigor and parsimony.
For reasons not made clear from the legislative history, twenty-three years after
the 1912 bill died, the Senate seemed to do little more than to dust off the 1912 bill,
report, and rationale, and reintroduce it. No particular cases of wrongful conviction
42 S. 2155 § 1 (emphasis added). In relevant part, section 1 read, “That any person, who,
having been convicted of any crime or offense against the United States, shall hereafter, on
appeal from the judgment of conviction or on the retrial or rehearing of his case, be found to
have been innocent of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense
against the United States . . . may, under the conditions hereinafter mentioned, apply by petition
for indemnification. . . .”
43 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO.
62-974, at 31 (1912).
44 Id.
45 S. 2155 §§ 2, 6. The United States could examine witnesses, have access to all testimony
taken and “resist all claims presented under this Act by all proper legal defenses.” Id. § 8.
46 Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
47 S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 32.
48 S. 2155 § 5.
49 Id. § 1 (allowing indemnification for “pecuniary injury he has sustained through his
erroneous conviction and/or imprisonment”).
50 Id. § 9.
51 S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 33.
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subsequent to those of Toth and Adolf Beck, who was wrongly convicted of a theft in
England in 1896, were cited in the legislative reports to prompt renewed calls for the
legislation. The only thing which appeared to put wrongful conviction compensation
again on the legislative docket was the 1932 publication of Professor Borchard’s
Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Actual Errors of Criminal Justice.52 Essentially
the National Registry of Exonerations of its time, the book was noted, but only in
passing, at the conclusion of the 1938 House Report,53 reflecting Professor Borchard’s
episodic, but persistent, advocacy for his vision of justice.
In 1936, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported Senate Bill 2155 to
the Senate with two important amendments recommended by Attorney General
Homer Cummings.54 The first, in Section 1, would require the claimant to have been
found “not guilty,” rather than innocent, of the crime for which he was convicted
following appeal, retrial, or rehearing.55 The Attorney General stated that the
amendment was required because there is no such verdict as “innocent.”56 He took
comfort that this proposed amendment would not open compensation to those not
“entirely innocent” because Section 4 of the bill still imposed on the claimant the
burden of showing innocence.57
The second amendment was that the word “act” in Section 4 be changed to
“crime.”58 One is charged with crimes, not acts. The Attorney General further agreed
that compensation was due “in the rare and unusual instances” in which a person was
found “entirely innocent” in contrast to situations in which convictions were reversed
“on the ground of insufficiency of proof or . . . whether the facts charged and proven
constituted [a criminal] offense.”59 He, like Borchard, believed it necessary to
“separate from the group of persons whose convictions have been reversed those few
who are in fact innocent of any offense whatever.”60
The rationale offered for the bill in the resulting Senate Report is thin, resting
principally on two grounds, neither of which would be terribly persuasive today. First,
it noted that most European countries compensated the unjustly convicted.61 Second,

52 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932). At this point in his career, Borchard was a professor at Yale Law
School.
53 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 4 (1938).
54 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1, 3 (1936).
55 Id. at 1; S. 2155 § 1.
56 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 3. The Attorney General also expressed “doubt” that wrongly
convicted persons who served no time in prison should be compensated. Id.
57 Id.
58 S. 2155 § 4.
59 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 3.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1.
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it quoted two law professors, one being Dean John H. Wigmore of Northwestern Law
School, who supported the bill and analogized the state’s duty of compensation to
eminent domain:
To deprive a man of liberty, put him to heavy expense in defending himself,
and to cut off his power to earn a living, perhaps also to exact a money fine
– these are sacrifices which the state imposes on him for the public purpose
of punishing crime.62
To the question of why no federal compensation statute had previously been
passed, Dean Wignore pulled no punches: “Because we have persisted in the selfdeceiving assumption that only guilty persons are convicted. We have been ashamed
to put into our code of justice any law which per se admits that justice may err. But let
us be realists.”63
The 1936 report also excerpted a statement from Professor Borchard’s 1912 Senate
Report featuring the then old case of Andrew Toth.64 Borchard noted that
Pennsylvania had no compensation statute (it still doesn’t) and that the Pennsylvania
legislature refused to compensate him through a private bill.65 Borchard also cited the
1896 case of Adolf Beck,66 who was incarcerated for seven years in England prior to
his exoneration and received no compensation.67 Nowhere is mentioned the irony that
the federal compensation statute advocated by Borchard would not have helped Toth,
who was convicted in a state court of a state crime.
Senator Maloney reintroduced the bill, now Senate Bill 750, in January of 1937,68
with exactly the same language as the 1935 bill but strangely without the sensible
amendments suggested by Attorney General Cummings. The bill was reported out of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in March of 1937 without amendment and with a
Judiciary Committee Report nearly identical to that of 1936.69

62 Id. at 2.
63 Id.
64 Id.; see also Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 734 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018)
(summarizing Toth case and Borchard’s scholarship).
65 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 2.
66 For more on the Beck case, which involved not violence, but theft, see Brian Cathcart, The
(Oct.
17,
2004),
Strange
Case
of
Adolf
Beck,
INDEP.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-strange-case-of-adolf-beck-535209.html.
67 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 2. The cases of Toth and Beck are mentioned in a 1916 Yale Law
Journal article, James W. Garner, Criminal Procedure in France, 25 YALE L.J. 255, 282 (1916).
Garner recommends that a French 1895 wrongful conviction compensation statute be replicated
in the United States and England. Oddly, citing Borchard’s own work, Garner notes that Beck
in fact received $25,000 from the Parliament. Id. at 282 n.96.
68 S. 750, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 220 (1937). The bill was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee on March 22, 1937.
69 S. REP. NO. 75-202, at 1,3 (1937). That Report reprinted the suggestions made by Attorney
General Cummings in 1936, but they were not reflected in the 1937 bill.
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The Senate bill, then, had two essential prongs.70 The first prong was procedural
– a requirement that there be a two-fold finding: that the claimant be innocent after
appeal, retrial, or rehearing and that the claimant be not guilty of any other federal
offense.71 The second prong was substantive, requiring a showing of innocence in one
of two ways: that the act with which the claimant was charged was not committed at
all or, if committed, was not committed by the claimant.72
So understood, satisfying these requirements was impossible in practice. A finding
of innocence is rarely the outcome of post-conviction relief.73 A vacatur or reversal of
conviction or a reversal and grant of a new trial would instead be the typical remedies
in successful post-conviction litigation.74 Nor, as Attorney General Cummings
understood, would the successful result of a retrial be a verdict of “innocent.” It would
be not guilty.
Moreover, how is the prospective plaintiff to obtain a finding that he or she is not
guilty of other offenses against the United States? There was no obvious mechanism
by which the post-conviction court would have occasion to decide the absence of guilt
of crimes not charged in the indictment. In 1938, the flawed Senate bill was
extensively redrafted in the House Judiciary Committee,75 and Congress passed the
House bill.76 The result, however, was not much of an improvement.
The principal revision was to replace the opportunity to present testimony and
evidence to the Court of Claims with the ministerial requirement that the claimant
simply present the Court with a certificate of innocence from the federal court in which
he or she were convicted.77 The intent, perhaps, was to streamline the process in the
Court of Claims. But, doing so led to two difficulties.
First, while the statute prescribed what a certificate of innocence needed to recite,
it established no burden of proof by which the claimant needed to prove each element
to the convicting court.78 Nor did it establish any procedures by which the convicting
70 S. 750 § 1, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 2469–70 (1937).
71 Id.
72 Id. § 4.
73 See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (2010-2011)
(“Courts almost never rule on the question of actual innocence. The simple story of clear
innocence is not a story the criminal justice system is designed to accommodate.”).
74 See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a
Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in
New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1473 n.258 (20122013) (collecting cases).
75 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, 52 Stat. 438 (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513); see also Bluestone, supra note 19, at 224–25.
76 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, 52 Stat. at 438.
77 This was said to be in keeping with the then-present practice and procedure of the Court
of Claims. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299 (1938). Unlike the Senate bill, the enacted statute
required, as a condition for compensation, that the claimant serve time in prison. Id.
78 Id. at 1–2.
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court should adjudicate petitions for the required certificate of innocence.79 Those
were left entirely in the hands of the convicting court.
Second, by assigning the certificate of innocence the central role in the Court of
Claims’ compensation process, the drafters felt the need to deal with two additional
matters – how to define the scope of people entitled to file a petition for compensation
with the Court of Claims, and how to prescribe the recitals of the certificate that would
be sufficient to authorize compensation.80 The result was a complicated mess. Section
1, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 729, was a dreadfully long sentence:
That any person who, having been convicted of any crime or offense against
the United States and having been sentenced to imprisonment and having
served all or any of part of his sentence, shall hereafter, on appeal or on a
new trial or rehearing, be found not guilty of the crime of which he was
convicted or shall hereafter receive a pardon on the ground of innocence, if
it shall appear that such person did not commit any of the acts with which he
was charged or that his conduct in connection with such charge did not
constitute a crime or offense against the United States or any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, in which the
offense or acts are alleged to have been committed, and that he has not, either
intentionally, or by willful misconduct, or negligence, contributed to bring
about his arrest or conviction, may . . . maintain suit against the United States
in the Court of Claims for damages . . . .81
The statute did adopt Attorney General Cummings’ first recommended change
from “innocent” to “not guilty.”82 That resolved one of the difficulties in the Senate
version. But it did not accept his second recommendation that “act” be changed to
“crime.” In fact, it made matters more difficult for plaintiffs in three ways.
First, believing that the Senate Bill’s two-part requirement that persons be innocent
“of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense against
the United States” was “not definite and specific enough,”83 it added a requirement
that it “appear” that the claimant did not commit the “acts” with which he was charged
without indicating where such a negative finding should appear. Second, the
unexplained use of the plural word “acts,” found in no prior legislative proposal,
would seem to require plaintiffs to disprove that they committed each act charged in
the indictment. That would include cases in which the charged crime required proof
of multiple acts, some of which might, alone, be entirely innocent behavior. Third, in
addition to showing that the conduct did not constitute a federal crime, the statute

79 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2018).
80 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2.
81 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 1, 52 Stat. at 438. Note that the narrowing of the “other
offense” provision to those in connection with the charges for which there was a wrongful
conviction eliminates the overbreadth problem identified in footnote 33.
82 Id.; S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936).
83 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2.
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expanded the provision to include that the conduct not be crimes of any state, territory,
or the District of Columbia.84
Although generally tightening the requirements, the statute was recast in one
unexplained and apparently liberalizing way. The statute used the disjunctive “or” in
describing the requirements, stating that it be found that the plaintiff did not commit
any of the charged acts or that the conduct in connection with such charge not
constitute a federal or state crime.85 In every proposal except the House bill of 1912,
the conjunctive “and” was used.86
The statute thus raised the theoretical possibility that someone who committed
some charged acts, but those acts did not constitute another crime, or that someone
who committed no charged acts, but whose conduct related to the charged crime
violated a different crime could be eligible for compensation. The report, however,
using the conjunctive, insisted that it did not do what it plainly did. It said, “[i]n other
words, the claimant must be innocent of the particular charge and of any other crime
or offense that any of his acts might constitute.”87
In Section 2, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 730, the only admissible evidence that
the claimant was permitted to present to demonstrate eligibility for compensation was
a certificate of innocence issued by the court in which the claimant was convicted, or
a certified copy of the pardon containing the recitals or findings that:
(a) Claimant did not commit any of the acts with which he was charged;
or
(b) [T]hat his conduct in connection with such charge did not constitute a
crime or offense against the United States or any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, in which the
offense or acts are alleged to have been committed; and
(c) [T]hat he has not, either intentionally, or by willful misconduct, or
negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.88
These three recital requirements, notably (a), overlap what was required in Section
1. But, the placement of “or” at the end of section (a) and “and” at the end of section
(b) led to confusion. Did the certificate have to recite either (a) or (b), plus (c), or did
it only have to recite (a) or, alternatively, (b) plus (c)? The court in Keegan v. United
States89 puzzled over this question, concluding that the former was correct.90

84 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 1, 52 Stat. at 438.
85 Id.
86 S. 7675, 62d Cong. (1912); H.R. 26748, 62d Cong. (1912); S. 2155, 74th Cong. (1935);
H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938).
87 H.R. REP. 75-2299, at 2 (emphasis added).
88 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 2, 52 Stat. at 438.
89 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
90 Similarly, the Keegan court parsed through the language of 18 U.S.C. § 729 and found,
contrary to Hadley v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 112 (1944), that the claimant needed to prove
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In sum, the House started with a Senate bill which was flawed, but fixable. By
changing the locus of litigation from the Court of Claims to the court of conviction,
the House wound up narrowing and confusing the statute’s requirements in ways that
it either did not explain, did not intend, or misstated in the legislative history. The
result was a statute plagued by fuzzy thinking and language from which it has never
fully recovered.
C. 1948
The reorganization and recodification of Title 28 of the U.S. Code in 1948 resolved
some ambiguities91 and changed the structure of the compensation statute.92 28 U.S.C.
§ 1495 vested the Court of Claims with jurisdiction to render judgment on claims by
those “unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.”93
28 U.S.C. § 2513 reorganized the eligibility requirements for compensation by
combining Sections 729 and 730.94 No longer are there separate statutes which
identify the requirements a petitioner must meet to qualify to seek federal
compensation and, if satisfied, set forth the required recitals for a certificate of
innocence. The purpose of the reorganization was that the statute was “completely
rewritten in order to clarify ambiguities which made the statute unworkable as enacted
originally.”95
Section 2513(a) and (b) together state what the petitioner must plead and prove to
obtain compensation, the proof taking the form of a certificate of innocence issued by
the convicting court:
(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove
that:
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not
guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing
he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or
certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he

that he did not commit the acts for which he was convicted or that those acts did not constitute
a crime against the United State or other state or territory. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 637.
91 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) clarifies the “appears” problem described above by
referring to the “record or certificate.” The very brief legislative history of the recodification
says that the statute was “completely rewritten in order to clarify ambiguities which made the
statute unworkable as enacted originally.” 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. II 1948) (reviser’s note).
92 18 U.S.C. §§ 729, 730 were repealed and recodified. See Abu-Shawish v. United States,
898 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2018).
93 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1495, 62 Stat. 869, 941 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1495 (Supp. II 1948)), amended by Court of Federal Claims Technical and
Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
94 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2513, 62 Stat. at 978 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2513).
95 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. II 1948) (reviser’s note).
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has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust
conviction, and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions
in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United
States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by
misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.
(b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon
wherein such facts are alleged to appear, and other evidence thereof shall not
be received.96
The statute retained the $5,000 cap on damages.97 So things remained almost
entirely unchanged for over fifty years.
D. 2000–2003
In 2000, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced The Innocence Protection
Act of 2000.98 Section 301 would have amended the $5,000 cap on damages in 28
U.S.C. § 2513(e). The bill sought to increase the amount of damages that could be
awarded to a maximum of $50,000 per year of incarceration and a maximum of
$100,000 per year for those sentenced to death.99 The bill would further have directed
the court to consider “the circumstances surrounding the unjust conviction . . .
including any misconduct by officers or employees of the Federal Government,” the
“length and conditions of the unjust incarceration of the plaintiff,” and “the family
circumstances, loss of wages, and pain and suffering of the plaintiff” in determining
the appropriate amount of damages.100
The compensation piece of the subsequent 2001 Innocence Protection Act bill
introduced in both the House and Senate was revised. It called for a flat award of
$50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration and not more than $100,000 per year of
incarceration on death row.101 The bill eliminated any standards for the court to
consider in deciding whether to award less than the cap in such cases. Senate Bill 486
was reintroduced in the Senate in 2002 and offered yet a different compensatory

96 28 U.S.C. § 2513.
97 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (Supp. II 1948). Between 1948 and 2004, Congress passed three
technical amendments to the statute. See Bluestone, supra note 19, at 225.
98 S. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 2690, 106th Cong. (2000).
99 S. 2690 § 301.
100 Id. A bill proposed in the House included identical language. See Innocence Protection
Act of 2000, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. § 301 (2000).
101 H.R. 912, 107th Cong. § 301 (2001); S. 486, 107th Cong. § 301 (as introduced in the
Senate, Mar. 7, 2001).
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metric.102 It proposed $10,000 per year of incarceration without distinguishing
whether the case involved the death penalty.103
The report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 486 touched
on the proposal to increase the $5,000 cap. Describing it as “miserly,” the report
observed that many state statutes provided for more compensation while conceding
that most states, at that time, had no compensation statutes for those wrongfully
convicted in state court.104 It offered brief summaries of the cases of four state
exonerees who were not compensated for their wrongful convictions.105 It then
concluded with a description of the legislation’s humanitarian purpose, language never
cited in subsequent cases:
Putting one’s life back together after such an experience is difficult enough,
even with financial support. Without such support, a wrongly convicted
person might never be able to establish roots that would allow him to
contribute to society. To help repair the lives that are shattered by wrongful
convictions, the bill raises the Federal cap on compensation, and urges States
to follow suit—at least in cases where the wrongly convicted person was
sentenced to death. The new Federal cap proposed by the bill as reported is
significantly lower than the cap proposed by the bill as introduced, and
significantly lower than many Members of the Committee think appropriate.
It is very least that the Congress should do.106
The House bill introduced in 2003 returned to caps of $50,000 per year of
incarceration and $100,000 in death penalty cases.107 The subsequent House Judiciary
Committee Report does not explain the preference for higher caps, but includes the
Congressional Budget Office’s estimate that it “does not expect the number of such
cases or any increase in payments for this purpose to be significant.”108 As ultimately
passed in 2004 as part of the Justice For All Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e), was amended
to read:
The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed $100,000 for each 12month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced

102 S. 486, 107th Cong. (as reported in the Senate Oct. 16, 2002).
103 Id. § 401.
104 S. REP. NO. 107-315, at 35 (2002).
105 Id. at 35–37. None of these men would have been eligible for federal statutory
compensation because they were not wrongfully convicted in federal court.
106 Id. at 37. The Senate bill also encouraged states to provide compensation to exonerees
wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death in state capital cases. The minority report
supported increasing compensation only for those wrongfully convicted in federal capital cases.
Id. at 50.
107 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. § 331 (2013). The parallel Senate bill contained the same
language as the House bill. See S. 1700, 108th Cong. § 331 (2013).
108 H.R. REP. NO. 108-321, at 25 (2003).
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to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any other
plaintiff.109
III. THE DATA
The National Registry of Exonerations contains the country’s most accurate and
important listing of exonerations in the United States.110 Widely cited,111 the National
Registry documents each exoneration since 1989 and identifies the reasons for each
wrongful conviction. Among many other data points, the National Registry records
the race and gender of the exoneree, the court in which they were wrongly convicted
and calculates the amount of time the exoneree was wrongly incarcerated.112
The National Registry’s definition of “exoneration” is narrow and exacting. It is
not enough for someone’s criminal conviction to be reversed or set aside on appeal or
through a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, the National Registry defines an exoneration
as follows:
A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and,
following a post-conviction re-examination of the evidence in the case,
was either:
(1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency
with the authority to make that declaration; or
(2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a
government official or body with the authority to take that action.
The official action may be:
(i) a complete pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether
or not the pardon is designated as based on innocence;
(ii) an acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime for which the
person was originally convicted; or
(iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the person
was originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority
to enter that dismissal.

109 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e).
110 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4; Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 703.
111 See Radley Balko, Opinion, Report: Wrongful Convictions Have Stolen Over 20,000
POST
(Sept.
10,
2018),
Years
From
Innocent
Defendants,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/10/report-wrongful-convictionshave-stolen-at-least-20000-years-from-innocent-defendants/; Emily Barone, The Wrongly
Convicted, TIME (Mar. 16, 2017), https://time.com/wrongly-convicted/. The Registry was cited
in Justice Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567,
2571 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 911
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). It has been cited in over thirty other federal and state court
decisions.
112 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
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The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at least in
part, of evidence of innocence that either
(i) was not presented at the trial at which the person was convicted; or
(ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to the defendant and the
defense attorney, and to the court, at the time the plea was entered.
The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the official
action that exonerated the person. A person who otherwise qualifies has
not been exonerated if there is unexplained physical evidence of that
person’s guilt.113
In short, one qualifies for entry into the National Registry only if one is declared
factually innocent by an official or agency to make that designation, or if one’s pardon,
acquittal (following conviction), or dismissal of charges was the result, at least in part,
of newly discovered evidence of innocence. A reversal of a conviction on grounds of
insufficiency of evidence alone is not enough to be listed in the Registry.
I have used the National Registry’s data pertaining to exonerations of individuals
previously convicted in a state court in prior articles.114 In those articles, I explained
how I determined whether an exoneree has sought state statutory compensation or
compensation through a civil rights or state tort suit.115 I also described how I code
this compensatory activity, and how I define the codes applied.116 I have done much
the same for those convicted in federal court and subsequently exonerated since 1989.
As of January 1, 2021, the National Registry of Exonerations lists 118 persons
exonerated following conviction in a federal tribunal, six of which were convicted in
a military court.117 Of those remaining 112 exonerees, 67 were incarcerated and 45
were not.118 Those who were not incarcerated are not entitled to wrongful conviction
compensation.119 Sixty percent of these federal exonerees were incarcerated,
compared to 91% of persons convicted in state court and later exonerated.120 The
reason for this difference lies largely in the nature of the federal crime at issue and the
exoneree. Of the 112 exonerees, 48 were wrongly convicted of what might loosely be
defined as a white-collar crime – tax, securities, mail and wire fraud, and government

113
Glossary,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/2SWYTBRE].
114 Gutman, supra note 3, at 373 ̶ 74; Gutman & Sun, supra note 3.
115 Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 707–09; Gutman, supra note 3, at 434.
116 Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 711–15.
117 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
118 Id.
119 See 28 U.S.C.§ 2513(e).
120 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
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program frauds of one sort or another.121 Most were freed before and after trial on
bond.122
The 112 exonerees collectively were incarcerated for 287.2 years, or an average of
2.6 years per person.123 That compares to an average of 9.4 years for state
exonerees.124 Again, that difference can be explained by the high number of federal
exonerees who are not incarcerated. Sixty federal exonerees spent less than one year
in prison.125
The federal wrongful conviction compensation statute makes it clear that, in order
to obtain compensation, one requires a certificate of innocence issued by the
convicting court. A review of the federal docket in PACER, LEXIS CourtLink,
Bloomberg Law, and other databases can reveal whether the exoneree sought a
certificate of innocence from the federal court in which they were convicted.
Table 1 provides the compensation statistics for the 67 federal exonerees who were
incarcerated:
Not filing for federal statutory compensation
Premature cases
Filed for federal statutory compensation
Denied
Pending
Granted
Table 1

48
12
7
5
0
2

Claimants under the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute have six
years from the date the conviction is vacated to file a complaint with the Court of
Federal Claims.126 Of the 67 incarcerated federal exonerees, the applicable statute of
limitations has yet to run with respect to twelve. Thus, they are coded as premature.127
Of those twelve, only three have been exonerated since 2017, indicating that it is very
unlikely that the remaining nine will file.
Of the remaining 55 exonerees, only seven filed for compensation and just two of
those were granted. Stephen Jones, who was wrongfully incarcerated for 12.4 years

121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Excluding those who serve no time, the average is 10.3 years. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (6-year statute of limitations); see Bolduc v. United States, 248 F. App’x
162, 164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (holding that the six-year
statute of limitations accrues on the date the conviction is vacated, rather than the date of
issuance of the certificate of innocence).
127 Table 1 lists them as “premature” and that number is not included in the total of not filing.
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
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on federal drug charges, received $551,985.65.128 Antonino Jones, who was
incarcerated for 2.5 years for drug trafficking and carjacking, received $137,397.26.129
Just over 3% of incarcerated federal exonerees have received federal statutory
compensation, accounting for just 6.5% of the years lost.130 Of the five denied, two
claims were dismissed on technical procedural grounds,131 and one was dismissed on
statute of limitations grounds.132 The two denied on the merits were Michael Holmes
and Maria Hernandez, whose cases are discussed below.133
The contrast with those potentially eligible for compensation under a state
wrongful conviction compensation statute is striking. The following table sets forth
data pertaining to the 2,100 persons listed in the Registry who were exonerated of state
crimes after incarceration in states with compensation statutes. Fifteen states lack such
statutes. In total, 40.5% of incarcerated state exonerees have received state
compensation, accounting for 48.9% of the years lost.134
Not filing for state statutory compensation
Premature cases
Filed for state statutory compensation
Denied
Pending
Granted
Table 2

761 (36.2%)
191 (9.1%)
1148 (54.7%)
177 (15.4%)
121 (10.5%)
850 (74%)

IV. THE STATUTE AS APPLIED
A. Borchard’s Proposal and Its Flaws
Before examining how the statute has been applied in practice, it is worth
reimagining Borchard’s conception of the “deserving.” With that understanding, we

128 Settlement agreement on file with author.
129 Lyons v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552, 553 (2011).
130 Federal exonerees may, in addition to statutory compensation, seek compensation under
the Federal Torts Claims Act, federal civil rights theories, including Bivens claims, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 (1971), and/or for
attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). My research has revealed that 25 federal exonerees have sought
compensation under one or more of these theories. Seventeen were unsuccessful; one case
remains pending and 7 received compensation. Of the seven, one was Stephen Jones.
131 Carl and Christopher Veltmann’s complaints in the Court of Federal Claims were
dismissed because they failed to produce certificates of innocence from the court of conviction.
Veltmann v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 426 (1997).
132 See Bolduc v. United States, 248 F. App’x 162, 164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
133 Except for them, none of the individuals whose cases are discussed below are listed in
the National Registry.
134 Data on file with the author.
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can better assess the extent to which the statute he drafted and its interpretation diverge
from those original principles.
One imagines that Borchard approached his effort with a sense of both modernism
and moderation. He viewed the United States as far behind Europe; neither the federal
government nor any state had enacted a wrongful conviction compensation statute by
1912. While many European countries had far more progressive laws on the books,
Borchard started small, planting a seed to gain support perhaps with a long-term vision
that with a legislative foot in the door more progressive reform could follow.
Borchard then had to argue that his aim was not to pay a lot of people who were
arrested and not convicted of charged crimes, or who were convicted but whose
convictions were overturned, as some European countries did. The American
“deserving” instead were a much smaller group of people who suffered a much more
significant injustice. The Borchard “deserving” had three characteristics: 1) they were
wrongly convicted, 2) they were innocent, and 3) they were blameless victims of a
system that produced a bad outcome.135
We thus see the origins of the timidity of Borchard’s vision in the face of what he
likely expected to be opposition by protectors of the public fisc. He believed fervently
in his humanitarian cause and worked tirelessly to document cases of wrongful
conviction to underscore the moral case for wrongful conviction compensation. But,
he understood that there would be doubters – those skeptical of even plausible claims
of wrongful conviction, those concerned about paying people whose convictions were
set aside on technicalities, and those worried about scammers manipulating the
scheme to get money.
Thus, his task, Congress’ task, and the task of all state legislatures considering
state wrongful conviction compensation statutes has been to strike a delicate balance
– to narrow the rules of eligibility to appease the doubters, but not so far as to disentitle
those who truly merited compensation. To accomplish that goal, Borchard made one
serious mistake that plagues us still.
How does a plaintiff136 in a case seeking compensation show that they were
wrongly convicted? For Borchard, it was when an appellate court on appeal or a trial
jury on retrial said they were innocent.137 This responded to the doubters’ concerns
about paying people whose convictions were set aside on a procedural technicality.
Don’t worry, responded Borchard, unlike those whose convictions were reversed on
procedural grounds who might nevertheless be guilty, these are clearly deserving
people whose convictions were reversed on grounds of innocence or who were found
innocent on retrial.138
135 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 209 (1912).

FOR

ERRORS

OF

136 I use the term plaintiff to describe criminal defendants who seek a certificate of innocence
in the court of conviction even though that request is technically a part of the criminal docket.
The courts have regarded such requests as civil in nature. Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278,
1283 (7th Cir. 1993).
137 Of course, as discussed, Attorney General Cummings pointed out that Borchard
erroneously used the word “innocent” instead of “not guilty.” S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936).
138 This conception makes the separate requirement of a showing of innocence essentially
duplicative.
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The House report poorly explained this distinction:
The claimant cannot be one whose innocence is based on technical or
procedural grounds, such as lack of sufficient evidence, or a faulty indictment
– such cases as where the indictment may fail on the original count, but
claimant may yet be guilty of another or minor offense.139
Attorney General Cummings’ letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee echoed a
similar concern about those benefitting from a technicality:
Ideal justice would seem to require that in the rare and unusual instances in
which a person who has served the whole or part of a term of imprisonment,
is later found to be entirely innocent of the crime of which was convicted,
should receive some redress. On the other hand, reversals in criminal cases
are more frequently had on the ground of insufficiency of proof or on the
question as to whether the facts charged and proven constituted an offense
under some statute. Consequently, it would be necessary to separate from the
group of persons whose convictions have been reversed, those few who are
in fact innocent of any offense whatever.140
The sentence from the House report and Cummings’ letter are the only passages
in the lengthy legislative history that explain the rationale for the language of the
statute. In contrast to the Borchard and Wignore focus on the statute’s humanitarian
purpose, these passages are ones of exclusion. The caselaw almost uniformly cites the
House Report, the Cummings letter, and/or cases that do in support of limiting
interpretations of the statute. 141 Rarely is the remedial purpose mentioned.
Cummings was not wrong. Borchard’s modest conception of the statute does
require a method for identifying those “few” who are factually innocent. Borchard’s
proposal, largely adopted by Congress in this respect, fails to do that properly. The
problem lies in the nature of a wrongful conviction. As the National Institute of Justice
explains, “[a] conviction may be classified as wrongful for two reasons: 1) The person
convicted is factually innocent of the charges. 2) There were procedural errors that
violated the convicted person's rights.”142 These categories are not always mutually
exclusive; they can be overlapping.
However, Congress, worried about compensating all “procedural winners,”
overlooked the reality that some might also be factually innocent. After all, many Due
Process violations arise from unconstitutional misconduct either intended to yield a

139 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938). What this passage probably meant was to evince
concern that those whose convictions are reversed on procedural grounds could be still guilty
of the charged crime, not a different offense.
140 S. REP. NO. 75-202, at 3 (1937).
141 United States v. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d 710, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 170 ̶ 71 (4th Cir. 2010); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 840 (5th
Cir. 1963).
142 Wrongful Conviction, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/justice-systemreform/wrongful-convictions [https://perma.cc/LF4Q-XMZP]; Brad Smith et al., How Justice
System Officials View Wrongful Convictions, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 664 (2011).
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wrongful conviction or willfully indifferent to the possibility.143 Adopting language
close to Borchard’s, Congress required plaintiffs to show that they were found “not
guilty of the offense of which he was convicted.”144 This language, in Section
2513(a)(1), seemingly precludes those whose convictions were overturned on Due
Process-based fair trial grounds undeveloped in 1912, 1938, or 1948 from the
opportunity to demonstrate their innocence because their convictions were not set
aside on the ground that they were not guilty. Fearful of compensating all “procedural
winners,” Congress overcorrected and ensured none were.
As it turned out, and explained below, Section 2513(a)(1) has proven to be a barrier
to some claimants, but not as many as one might expect. A combination of generous
interpretations of the provision in some cases and parties and courts ignoring it entirely
in others, has allowed some “procedural winners” to argue their innocence under
Section 2513(a)(2). For almost all of them, however, this luck is short-lived because
the skepticism of “procedural winners” that underlies the drafting of Section
2513(a)(1) seeps into the consideration of their innocence under Section 2513(a)(2).
The House report and Cummings letter make it clear that “procedural winners” are
a disfavored class. Courts correctly observe that procedural reversal or acquittal on
retrial are not tantamount to innocence.145 From that accurate premise, some courts
draw on the legislative history to support a misplaced suspicion that members of this
disfavored class are not among those who are “truly” or “altogether” innocent and thus
deserving of compensation.146 This created a formidable burden on these plaintiffs to
prove innocence – a high bar that is rarely met.
This burden manifests itself in what I call “room thinking.” Courts say that they
are applying a preponderance of the evidence standard required to prove innocence,
but in practice “room thinking” demands that plaintiffs refute all evidence of guilt –
to clear the room of all doubt of innocence. I cannot prove that the limited scope of
the statute and narrow interpretations of it explain the extraordinary underutilization
of it demonstrated in Part III. Many other factors might explain it, but the potential
correlation is striking, and one Edwin Borchard would surely regard as disappointing.
B. The Caselaw
147

Putting aside those pardoned,
and prove three elements:

the statute clearly requires the plaintiff to plead

143 Official misconduct was present in 54.5% of exonerations listed in the National Registry.
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
144 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1).
145 Cf. Osborn, 322 F.2d at 841–42 (denying request for certificate of innocence resting
solely on grounds that the conviction was reversed because the court-martial lacked
jurisdiction); United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952) (“Innocence of the
petitioner must be affirmatively established and neither a dismissal nor a judgment of not guilty
on technical grounds is enough.”).
146 Osborn, 322 F.2d at 840.
147 I set this narrow category aside for the purpose of this analysis.
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1. That the conviction was reversed or set aside on the ground that the
plaintiff was not guilty of the offense or that they were found not guilty
of such offense after retrial; and
2. That the plaintiff did commit any of the acts charged or that the acts or
omissions charged did not constitute an offense against the United States,
state or territory; and
3. That the plaintiff did not cause their prosecution by misconduct or
neglect.148
The statute limits the plaintiff to only one form of proof of these elements and no
others: a certificate of innocence issued by the court in which he or she was wrongly
convicted.149 To obtain federal compensation, the exoneree must obtain a certificate
of innocence from the convicting court, which must properly set forth the recitals
required in Section 2513(a), and file it with the Court of Federal Claims.150 If the Court
finds the certificate to be in proper form, it simply has the ministerial task of entering
judgment for the plaintiff.151 The Court of Federal Claims has no power to vacate
wrongful convictions, to issue certificates of innocence, or to review other courts’
decisions not to issue one.152
There are two major areas of litigation in this area: whether the convicting court
should issue the certificate and, whether, if it fails to do so or does not do so in
accordance with the requirements of Section 2513, a case filed pursuant to Section
1495 in the Court of Federal Claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.153 My focus is on the first. I
will examine each of these three prongs in detail and show that as to each there is a
disconnect between the statutory language and either Borchard’s vision or statutory
intent, or both.

148 See United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Graham,
608 F.3d 164, 170 ̶ 71 (4th Cir. 2010).
149 § 2513(b); Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2018).
150 See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 701, 704–05 (1990).
151 See Roberson v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 857, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Of course, there
may be disputes about the amount of compensation that should be awarded. See, e.g., Crooker
v. United States, 828 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff is not entitled
to compensation for time served that was credited to a subsequent sentence); Lyons v. United
States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552, 565 (2011) (awarding plaintiff $50,000 per year, the compensatory
metric in place at the time of the filing of the complaint rather than $5,000 in compensation
which was in place during the plaintiff’s imprisonment).
152 See Johnson v. United States, 411 F. App’x 303, 305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Sykes
v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (2012).
153 This second issue is discussed in detail in Bluestone, supra note 19, at 241. The author
concludes that the failure to file a satisfactory certificate of innocence should not be regarded
as a jurisdictional defect but, instead, as a failure of proof.
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Prong 1

Section 2513(a) focuses on the process after conviction and is straightforward to
apply. In what I will call Prong 1(A), the reversal or vacatur of the conviction must be
on grounds that the plaintiff is not guilty of the offense for which they were convicted.
Alternatively, regardless of the reasons for the setting aside of the conviction, this
Section can be satisfied by showing what Prong 1(B) requires – a finding of not guilty
after retrial. If the plaintiff is not retried, Prong 1(B) is unavailable.
The difficulty is that reasonably common grounds for a vacatur, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, Brady violations, prosecutorial or police misconduct, or the
reliance on unreliable forensic evidence, are typically not alone enough to satisfy
Prong 1(A). If a conviction is set aside on any of these grounds, or other procedural
infirmities,154 it is often because the court has found that the trial was
unconstitutionally unfair, not because the defendant was not guilty.155
So understood, Prong 1(A) is a very substantial hurdle potentially affecting a large
number of exonerees. Of the wrongful convictions listed in the National Registry, one
or more of these issues was present in a substantial majority of them. It is also one that
may not be in the minds of criminal defense attorneys pursuing post-conviction
remedies. Their task is to try to get their clients’ convictions set aside using arguments
with the greatest likelihood of success. If that is a “technical or procedural” ground,
so be it. Even if more difficult (at least in some cases) claims of innocence are also
made, there is surely no guarantee that the appellate court would reach the innocence
issue if it could reverse on the narrower ground.156 And, if successful on this technical
ground, the criminal defense attorney is certainly going to press the prosecutor to drop
the charges. They would hardly welcome a retrial in the hope that, if successful, it
could possibly lead to federal compensation. Fifty thousand dollars a year is not worth
that sort of gamble. Prong 1 stands as a potentially powerful explanation for the
paucity of attempts, much less successful ones, of exonerees to obtain federal
compensation.

154 See Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding that Prong 1(A)
was not satisfied in case in which a conviction of murder in court martial charging violation of
provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice was set aside because the provision does not
apply in peace time); Cratty v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 897, 899–900 (S.D. Ohio 1949)
(denying request for certificate of innocence on Prong 1(A) grounds by plaintiff whose
conviction was overturned on statute of limitations grounds).
155 See, e.g., People v. Trulove, No. A130481, 2014 WL 36469, at *1 (Cal. App. 2014)
(prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel); Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998,
1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (Brady violation); Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 304 (Ind. App. 2012)
(newly discovered evidence and Brady violation); Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 111 (4th Cir.
2011) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 327 (S.C. 1999)
(Brady violation); McMillian v. State, 616 So.2d 933, 949 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (suppression
of exculpatory evidence).
156 Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in
Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123,
139 (2010).
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Hernandez v. United States,157 a case featuring a defendant who is listed in the
National Registry of Exonerations, is a good recent example of the problem. Maria
Hernandez was convicted of a drug and money laundering conspiracy in which she
was alleged to have been sent $125,000 by one of the conspirators that was actually
sent to her sister-in-law, Maria Pena.158 As it happens, the address to which the money
was sent had two houses – one that Hernandez vacated before the delivery and the
other owned by Pena.159 Hernandez’s attorney failed to investigate or present
evidence on the obvious defenses.160 Without evidence of the delivery, all that was
left was a highly attenuated and circumstantial piece of evidence against her.161 She
filed for a writ of habeas corpus.162
The district judge found that Hernandez’ attorney’s ineffective assistance of
counsel deprived her of a fair trial.163 Applying a standard that she would have to
show “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,”164 the district court concluded that
absent counsel’s errors, there was a probability of acquittal.165 The prosecution then
dropped the charges.166
Hernandez petitioned the court for a certificate of innocence.167 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the denial of the petition.168 The court reasoned the relief awarded must be
“on the ground that” or “because” she was not guilty.169 Here, the relief was awarded
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel – “procedural grounds.”170 True,
that procedural ground had a substantive component – whether there was a reasonable
probability that without errors, the jury would have had reasonable doubt of guilt.171

157 Hernandez v. United States, 888 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 2018).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 221–22.
161 Id. at 221.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 223.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 222.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 224.
169 Id. at 223.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
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But that standard was lower than “not guilty,” and thus the certificate of innocence
was denied.172
The Hernandez case is one in which there is pretty compelling evidence of factual
innocence. Yet, she was barred from trying to make that case because she failed Prong
1(A) and was not retried. Above, I explained the source of this language and how it
overcorrected the problem it was trying to solve – the worry about compensating those
whose reversals were based on “technical” or “procedural” grounds.173 Certainly,
Congress did not want to pay people based solely on a “technical” reversal (or acquittal
after retrial); that is not innocence.174 But, Cummings’ letter at least hints at the correct
view that those whose convictions have been reversed on any grounds should be
permitted to try to be among those few able to prove that they are “truly innocent.”175
After all, while reversal on technical or procedural grounds does not prove innocence,
it does not preclude it either.
United States v. Lyons, in contrast, involving one of the two federal exonerees to
be compensated under the statute, skirts the language of the statute and arrives at the
right result.176 In Lyons, the court dismissed Lyons’ convictions on Brady and Giglio
grounds after evidence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct came to light.177 The
court found that Section 2513(a)(1) was satisfied because he was “exonerated as to all
of the charges against him.”178 The statute says nothing about exoneration; it requires
the conviction to be set aside on the grounds that Lyons was “not guilty of the offense
of which he was convicted.”179 Such was not the case for Lyons. His conviction was

172 Id.
173 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938) (“The claimant cannot be one whose innocence is
based on technical or procedural grounds . . .”).
174 Id.; see also Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Cratty v. United
States, 83 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D. Ohio 1949).
175 Indeed, one of the examples of “technical” reversal cited in the legislative history was
insufficiency of the evidence. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2. Yet, some courts have either held
that such grounds satisfy Prong 1. United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 2014);
Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 984 (7th Cir. 2013); see United States v. Gaskins, No.
1:04-cr-379, 2019 WL 7758898, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2019), or pass by it without mention.
United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 277 (6th Cir. 1952) is an example. In Brunner, a man’s
conviction for theft of postal property was in large part the result of his wife’s incriminating
testimony. The conviction was reversed on the ground that her testimony was erroneously
admitted. Brunner lost his petition for a certificate of innocence because the court used the
erroneously admitted evidence against him to conclude that he was not factually innocent. Id.
at 280. He could have been denied on Prong 1 grounds because the reversal of his conviction
was not on the ground that he was not guilty of theft. Id.; see also United States v. Keegan, 71
F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
176 United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1369 (M.D. Fl. 2010).
177 Id. at 1364.
178 Id. at 1366. Other charges were dropped by the prosecution.
179 Id.
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set aside on “procedural” grounds. Lyons was the beneficiary of a generous
interpretation of the statute while Hernandez was not.
2.

Prong 2

Before addressing the substance of the innocence of Prong 2, let’s first examine
how courts have approached the process of applying Prong 2 to requests for a
certificate of innocence. A very influential early decision under the 1938 version of
the statute, United States v. Keegan,180 laid the groundwork. The court correctly
observed that Section 730 (like its successor statute) “is entirely silent as to what
procedure a court should follow in determining whether or not a petitioner is entitled
to a certificate.”181
In the absence of statutory direction, the court made two initial and sensible
decisions. First, the petition for a certificate of innocence was reassigned to the judge
who tried the underlying criminal case.182 Who would know the evidence better than
the trial judge?183 Second, the court decided not to rest solely on the criminal trial
record, but instead permitted the parties to present additional facts by affidavit.184
The absence of legislative guidance leaves the convicting court with substantial
discretion to craft the procedures for deciding petitions for a certificate of
innocence.185 That discretion, however, has its limits at least in the Seventh Circuit.
There, the trial judge should not simply conclude, without consideration of the trial
record, that a reversal of a conviction or acquittal after retrial is, alone, insufficient to

180 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 624.
181 Id. at 637.
182 Id.
183 Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 448 (2004). This can be a mixed blessing as Keegan found
out. It is readily apparent in Judge Barksdale’s opinion that he was not happy that the
convictions in his court of these German sympathizers were overturned. Keegan is well known
for its extensive examination of the legislative history of the statute. But, it is never criticized
for the very dubious grounds on which it denied Keegan’s petition. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 638–
40 (regarding as dicta to be ignored the Supreme Court’s holding that the defendants were not
guilty of counseling evasions because the Court directed the acquittal on conspiracy to counsel
evasion charges even though the acquittal was not based on the law or facts of conspiracy); see
also Weiss v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Barksdale, J.) (finding the
same and adding that the defendant in the same German Bund matter had not shown innocence
because he and co-defendants were “disposed to counsel evasion”). In contrast, the district judge
who presided over Abu-Shawish’s first criminal trial in 2006 granted his petition for a certificate
of innocence in 2020. See United States v. Abu-Shawish, Cr. No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132322 (E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020).
184 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 637–38. Although the judge thought it would rarely be necessary,
he had no objection to hearing live witnesses if appropriate.
185 United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2010)); Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
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demonstrate factual innocence.186 At a minimum, the parties must be permitted to offer
new evidence. The court must take a “fresh look” at such evidence and relevant
portions of the trial record to determine whether the petitioner is factually innocent.187
Keegan went on to observe that because the statutes effect a waiver of sovereign
immunity, their terms are to be strictly construed.188 The court did not mention another
canon: that humanitarian statutes are to be interpreted liberally in accordance with
their remedial purposes.189 Keegan instead imposed a substantial burden of proof on
the plaintiff: “[I]t would seem to me obvious that the burden is on the petitioner at
least to the extent that the court should not grant the certificate unless it is satisfied
from the record before it that the petitioner is altogether innocent.”190
Neither Keegan nor the early cases specify the petitioner’s burden of proof. More
recent cases have held, without analysis, that the petitioner’s burden of showing an
entitlement to a certificate of innocence is by a preponderance of the evidence,
consistent with the ordinary burden of proof in civil cases.191 Nonetheless, that burden
has generally been very difficult to shoulder.192 A court of appeals has only once
reversed a district court’s denial of a certificate of innocence,193 and two trial court
awards of certificates of innocence have been reversed on appeal.194
This is the empirical support for the courts’ reading of the statute as creating a
“high bar”195 to compensation. There are two sources for this high bar, one imposed

186 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2018). But see Rigsbee,
204 F.2d at 72 (rejecting argument that acquittal after retrial requires issuance of certificate of
innocence but engaging in no further record review or fact finding).
187 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 733 (quoting Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1278 (7th
Cir. 1992)). The Magistrate Judge in Abu-Shawish subsequently had an evidentiary hearing on
the petition for a certificate of innocence. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, United States v.
Abu-Shawish, No. 03-cr-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017), ECF No. 339.
188 Keegan, 71 F. Supp at 636.
189 See Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-946V, 2010 WL 1676767, at *6
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 9, 2010) (collecting cases); McLean v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775, 778
(D.S.C. 1947) (interpreting federal wrongful conviction compensation statute liberally in
accordance with its “beneficent purpose” to include convictions by court martial); Osborn v.
United States, 322 F.2d 835, 839–40 (5th Cir. 1963) (same); United States v. Lyons, 726 F.
Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
190 Keegan, 71 F. Supp at 636.
191 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 739; Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.
2018); United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2014); Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d at
1366.
192 United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 2010).
193 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 733 n.1.
194 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brunner,
200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952).
195 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 735 (citing Pulungan, 722 F.3d at 985).
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by the language of the statute, and one self-imposed. As we have seen in Prong 1 and
will see again in Prongs 2 and 3, there is unnecessary and/or unintended language in
the statute which has the effect of potentially precluding some of the “deserving” from
compensation. Those can be fixed by amendment.
In Prong 2 there are also discretionary approaches, based in part on an overreading
of the legislative history, that require a showing beyond that contemplated by the
preponderance standard, which raise the bar to compensation. These judicially
imposed limitations can be corrected by reconceiving the manner by which district
courts use their wide discretion to develop decision and fact-finding procedures.196
There are three aspects of Prong 2 worthy of closer examination, two of which are
discussed below and one of which is discussed in Part V in the context of the AbuShawish case. Recall, as discussed further below, that to satisfy Prong 2, plaintiffs
must show that they “did not commit any of the acts charged” [Prong 2(A)] or that his
“acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense”
against the United States, state, territory or the District of Columbia [Prong 2(B)].197
a.

Acts or Crimes?

What do we want the “deserving” to be innocent of? Borchard used the term “act”
to describe it: “[H]e must show that the act with which he was charged was not
committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by the accused.”198 Attorney
General Cummings understood what he meant and suggested that the word “crime”
be used instead.199 One is charged with and conceivably innocent of a crime, not an
act. 200 As explained above, the Senate included Cummings’ suggestion in Senate Bill
2155, but then without explanation dropped it in Senate Bill 750.
The 1938 version introduced for no obvious reason the language that exists today:
the plaintiff did not “commit any of the acts charged.”201 The use of the words “any”
and “acts” make it reasonably clear that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she
did not commit each of the acts that constitute the crime, even if some of the acts are
inherently innocent ones.202 This creates an unnecessary bar for plaintiffs seeking
federal wrongful conviction compensation.
The influential Keegan case illustrates why this crime/acts distinction is important.
The case involved a petition for a certificate of innocence by an attorney for the
196 Id. at 736; Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
197 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2).
198 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 33 (1912).

OF

STATE INDEMNITY

FOR

ERRORS

OF

199 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936).
200 For the court in Mills, that is proof that “acts charged” is not equivalent to “crimes.”
United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 2014). The result was a statute that was “not
necessarily more generous to a petitioner.” Id.
201 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, § 1, 52 Stat. 438, 438 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513) (emphasis added).
202 See Mills, 773 F.3d. at 571.
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German-American Bund who was found guilty of conspiracy during World War II to
violate Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.203 The relevant
provision of Section 11(3) made it a crime to counsel, aid, or abet another “to evade
registration or service” or to conspire with others to do so.204
Section 8(i) of the Act expressed the policy of the United States that employment
vacancies caused by the draft were not to be filled by members of the Communist
Party or the German-American Bund.205 Regarding that provision to be
unconstitutionally discriminatory, the Bund issued Command 37 notifying members
that they must register for the draft, but urging them to refuse military service until
Section 8(i) was revoked.206 Its purpose was to produce a test case to challenge the
statute’s constitutionality.207
After a month-long trial largely featuring evidence regarding the nature of the
Bund from which the jury was to infer the intent and purpose of the Command, twentyfour Bund members, including Keegan, were convicted.208 The Supreme Court
ultimately overturned Keegan’s conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.209
The Court held that the Bund Command’s exhortation to its members to register
for the draft, but to refuse to serve if drafted, was not a crime; counseling to evade
service was.210 It reasoned that “the surest way of rendering oneself incapable of
evading military service, of slipping away or escaping it, is to register.”211 To overtly
urge resistance is not to counsel “stealthily and by guile” to evade the law.212
Noting that the government did not argue that the Bund Command alone violated
the Act, the Court examined the prosecution’s remaining evidence.213 It parsed
through various statements made by the defendants and found that they showed, at
most, that they “were the kind of men who might be inclined to counsel evasion of
military service,” not that they actually did.214 The Court therefore held that the district
court erred in denying their motion for acquittal.215 Not surprisingly, Keegan sought a

203 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
204 50 U.S.C. § 311(3), (6).
205 Id. at § 308(i).
206 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 640.
207 Keegan v. United States, 525 U.S. 478, 485 (1945).
208 Id. at 480.
209 Id. at 478.
210 Id. at 487–88.
211 Id. at 487.
212 Id. at 494.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 488.
215 Id. at 495.
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certificate of innocence from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the court in which he was convicted.216
The court quickly concluded that Keegan had committed the acts for which he was
charged.217 That conclusion is surely correct; there was no dispute about what Keegan
did. Those acts, however, did not constitute a crime. Nonetheless, the statute’s focus
on acts, rather than crimes, required the denial of his petition.
United States v. Mills218 further illustrates the point. Mills, who had been
previously convicted of seven North Carolina state felonies, sold two stolen firearms
to a pawn shop.219 He was charged and convicted of the federal crime of being a felon
in the possession of a firearm.220 Following an intervening Fourth Circuit case,221 Mills
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that, as reinterpreted, he was not a felon
for purposes of the applicable federal statute because he could not have been
imprisoned for over a year for any of the seven state crimes.222 The writ was granted.223
Prong 2(B) was not available to Mills because his possession of the firearms was
a violation of North Carolina law.224 For Borchard, that alone would be sufficient to
deny his petition, but since Prong 2(A) and 2(B) are stated in the disjunctive, Mills
tried to satisfy Prong 2(A).225 That was a tall order. The majority explained that,
“when an indictment charges more than one act, if a petitioner commits any of the acts
charged, he is not eligible for a certificate of innocence.”226
The majority reasoned that the term “acts” was neither equivalent to “crime” nor
to the elements of the crime.227 A crime consists of elements. Some of those elements
are acts and some are a matter of one’s status. After the intervening Fourth Circuit’s
decision, the combination of Mills’ acts (possession) and status (a state felon) which
were once regarded as a violation of a federal criminal statute no longer were.

216 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
217 Id. at 638. The court denied the petition for a certificate of innocence on this and other
grounds. Id.; see also Weiss v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (in a case
brought by another of the German Bund defendants before the same judge deciding Keegan, the
court held that “the fact is that he did commit all of the acts with which he was charged, upon
proof whereof, his conviction followed”).
218 United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 2014).
219 Id. at 565.
220 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
221 See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2011).
222 Mills, 773 F.3d at 565.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 567.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at n.5.
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Nonetheless, the majority held that he indisputably committed one of the acts charged
– possession of the firearms.228 It held that “[t]he only plausible reading of § 2513 is
that possessing a firearm is an ‘act charged’ against Mills.”229 Possession of firearms
alone is not unlawful, 230 but commission of that lawful act resulted in Mills’ failure
to satisfy Prong 2(A).
Because of the unfortunate language of the statute, three groups of people will
likely be unable to satisfy Prong 2(A) and receive compensation. The first are those
convicted of crimes which did not actually occur as a matter of fact. There are
numerous examples of “no crime” cases of this sort in the National Registry,231 such
as the alleged murder being a suicide, the allegedly shaken baby’s death was really by
natural cause, the alleged child sexual abuse was made up through improper
suggestion, or the alleged arson was actually bad electrical wiring. In such cases, acts
by the defendant which had appeared suspicious, like carrying the baby, knowing and
being alone with the victim, or having access to the home in which there was a fire,
have in retrospect an innocent explanation. But, since the plaintiff did these charged
but innocent acts, they cannot satisfy Prong 2(A).
Second are those like Mills, convicted of a crime, which ultimately is determined
not to be a crime as a matter of law. In these cases, a proper interpretation of the
criminal statute yields a conclusion that those acts which the defendant did do not
actually constitute a violation of that statute. An example would arise from errors in
jury instructions that too broadly interpret the criminal statute.232 Another might be
cases in which the acts are legally justified, like self-defense.233 The acts were
committed, but they do not amount to a crime as a matter of law.
Third are cases in which a conviction is reversed on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. An example would be a plaintiff like Keegan who did the acts charged but
which no reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt constitute a
violation of a criminal statute.234 A plaintiff might do everything the government said
he did, but those acts alone are not enough to prove a crime.

228 Id. at 567.
229 Id. at 569.
230 Possession of firearms as a state felon, however, is unlawful. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14415.1(a) (2011).
231 As of January 1, 2021, 998 of the 2,706 exonerations in the Registry are “no crime” cases.
232 See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016) (reversing conviction
based on overly broad jury instruction defining “official act”); Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 367 (2010) (reversing conviction based on overly broad jury instruction defining
“honest services”).
233 Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72–73 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see also Marie v. State,
922 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Neb. 2019) (holding that claim of self-defense is insufficient to
demonstrate actual innocence under Nebraska Claims for Wrongful Conviction and
Compensation Act). But see Mills, 773 F.3d at 569 (noting that mens rea can be separated from
“acts charged”).
234 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006); Speight v. United States, 599 A.2d 794, 798
(D.C. 1991).
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One court has resisted this reading of the statute: the Seventh Circuit in Betts v.
United States,235 the only case reversing the denial of a certificate of innocence. In
Betts, an attorney was convicted of criminal contempt for failing to attend a court
hearing. Criminal contempt requires “a willful failure to comply with a lawful order
of reasonable specificity.”236 The Seventh Circuit reversed Betts’ conviction on the
ground that the order that he appear in court was not sufficiently clear.237 Thus, it
could not have been willfully violated.238 As the court explained, “Betts’ conduct,
quite simply, did not constitute a crime; he is, as the district court put it, ‘factually
innocent.’”239
Betts, though, clearly committed the acts (or omissions) that were charged.
Presumably, among the acts or omissions charged were that he received notice of the
order to appear in court and failed to show up to the hearing.240 Betts committed those
acts charged. So did Keegan and Mills. As a result, Betts should fail the Keegan test.
However, the Betts court interpreted the statute the way Cummings had wished it were
written – by imagining that the statute’s use of the term “acts” really meant “crime.”
The court flatly said so by concluding that Betts’ conduct did not constitute a crime.241
The result in Betts is the right one, and consistent with Borchard’s vision, and
Cummings’ preference, but not the one directed by the statute.
That is not to say that plaintiffs found to have committed no federal crime would
always satisfy Prong 2(A) if it used the word “crime.” Doing so would be substantially
easier in category two cases, above, like those of Mills and Betts, because a finding of
innocence turns on a conclusion of law. As discussed below, for “no crime” or
insufficiency of evidence cases, categories one and three, the task may be more
difficult, but not impossible. The plaintiff would need to advance some evidence of
innocence and persuade the judge that it is more likely than not that he or she did not
commit the crime. To that issue we turn next.
b.

Preponderance or Room?

As noted, in the absence of statutory direction, courts of conviction have broad
discretion to determine how to make the Prong 2 judgment.242 A key element of that
235 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1993).
236 In re Betts, 927 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1991).
237 Id. at 987.
238 Id.
239 Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284. In this sense, Betts is a variation of the second category of cases
described above where it is a court order, rather than a statute, that is interpreted.
240 In re Betts, 927 F.2d at 987.
241 Id. The court’s failure to squarely address Prong 2(A) is illustrated in its holding in which
it quoted Prong 1 and Prong 2(B), but not Prong 2(A). Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284. Perhaps the court
implicitly decided the case on Prong 2(A) grounds, reading Prongs 2(A) and 2(B) as disjunctive
requirements. The court, however, did not say that and used language to suggest that it
considered both prongs and found both satisfied. Id.
242 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2018).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

35

254

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:219

procedure is the plaintiff’s burden of proof. Recent cases have held that the plaintiff
must prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.243
How have courts operationalized this standard? The easy cases are ones in which
the plaintiff relies solely on a reversal or acquittal and offers no evidence of
innocence.244 Plaintiffs should lose those cases. For the harder cases in which the
record contains some evidence of innocence, many courts have asked whether the facts
in the record nevertheless “leave[] room for the possibility that the petitioner in fact
committed the offense with which he was charged.”245
Betts, the only case reversing the denial of a certificate of innocence, is responsible
for this unfortunate “room” language. The Seventh Circuit tried to show why Betts’
situation was different than the “technical” reversals of convictions unrelated to
innocence. It listed many examples of reversals or vacaturs for reasons unrelated to
innocence246 – lack of jurisdiction (Osborn), expiration of the statute of limitations
(Cratty), use of inadmissible evidence (Brunner), or failure of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt (Keegan).247
In such cases, the ground of the reversal left “room” for the possibility that the
plaintiff actually committed the crime. This was the point that the House report
inartfully tried to make.248 And, this was the reason why Congress unwisely drafted
Prong 1 in such a way that could bar the plaintiff from seeking to demonstrate
innocence in Prong 2. In contrast, having misinterpreted the statute to require
innocence of a crime, rather than acts as explained above, the Betts court held that
there was no “room” because “[c]ontempt . . . was legally impossible.”249
This logic helped Betts but left other cases out to dry. Prong 2(A) does not require
that guilt be legally impossible. But, when the notion of “room” for guilt is combined
with the passages of legislative history that require the plaintiff to be “truly innocent”
or “altogether innocent,” the burden placed on plaintiffs to demonstrate innocence

243 See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. Some state compensation statutes
employ a clear and convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-101
(2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2020).
244 Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Osborn v. United States, 322
F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Abreu, No. 11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 229911, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
245 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grubbs, 773
F.3d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2014); see also DeWitt v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 291, 299 (D.C.
2012).
246 Because these cases involved reversals on grounds other than a finding that the defendant
was not guilty of the crime he was convicted, these cases should not have gotten past the Prong
1 stage.
247 The parenthetical examples are mine, not the court’s.
248 H.R. REP. NO. 75–2299, at 2 (1938).
249 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 2013).
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often becomes insurmountable.250 In practice, it is far greater than the preponderance
of evidence standard.
One good test for this idea is in insufficiency of evidence cases. Even though the
legislative history regards these cases as examples of the kind of “technical” or
“procedural” reversals that should fail Prong 1, these cases have sometimes been held
to satisfy Prong 1.251 Thus, these insufficiency of evidence cases require a Prong 2(A)
analysis and test how that prong is applied to situations in which there is some
evidence or “room” for guilt, but not enough to convict.
United States v. Grubbs252 offers an example. In Grubbs, police searched Mae
Grubbs’ house as part of an investigation into stolen vehicles.253 Mae’s son Paul lived
with her in the house, and her other son Ernest only visited on occasion, including the
night before the search.254 During the search, police found a nine-millimeter handgun
in Paul’s bed.255 Paul admitted that it was his gun that he bought at a flea market.256
Mae testified that Ernest slept in a different room, and Ernest’s fingerprints were not
found on the weapon.257 Ernest, though, was convicted of being a felon in possession
of a handgun.258 The conviction was later overturned for lack of sufficient evidence.259
Ernest then petitioned for a certificate of innocence. What tied the gun to Ernest?
A neighbor, Jones, testified that sometime previously Ernest encountered him at
night as he was driving home. Apparently, Ernest accused Jones of having an affair
with Ernest’s sister. Jones and later Jones’ wife saw that Ernest had a dark colored
automatic handgun. However, neither of them could testify that it was the gun
retrieved from Paul’s bed.260
Is there “room” to conclude that the gun was Ernest’s? Sure. Jones and his wife
saw Ernest with a gun bearing some characteristics in common with the seized
weapon. But, is it more likely than not that it was not Ernest’s gun? In overturning his
conviction, the Sixth Circuit explained:
250 See, e.g., United States v. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2009).
251 United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 2014); Osborn v. United States, 322
F.2d 835, 840 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Valle, 467 F. Supp. 3d 194, 202 (S.D.N.Y.
2020). In other insufficiency cases, the analysis skips Prong 1. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d at
714; Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2018).
252 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 726.
253 Id. at 728.
254 United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 2014).
255 Id. at 437.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 436.
259 Id.
260 United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 729–30 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Grubbs,
506 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2014).
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At best, this testimony suggests that Grubbs possessed a black,
semiautomatic firearm at some point before the arrest. It is a tenuous leap . .
. to infer from Grubbs’s earlier possession that he constructively possessed
the same black, semi-automatic gun recovered from his brother’s bedroom at
the time of the arrest. Although it is true that the recovered firearm matched
Jones’s generic description, these attributes are too common to support a
conviction for constructive possession.261
The court further observed that there was no temporal connection between Jones’
glimpse of the gun and its seizure.262
Moreover, this is not a case in which the plaintiff relied solely on the lack of
persuasive evidence of guilt. He also offered exculpatory evidence – the gun was in
Paul’s bed, Paul admitted owning it, and Paul testified that he was with Ernest during
the conversation with Jones and had not seen a gun.263 Perhaps Paul was covering for
his brother, but there was apparently no evidence introduced to challenge his
credibility.264
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court’s denial of the certificate of
innocence.265 It found persuasive that Jones’ wife saw Ernest with a gun and that Jones
saw a similar gun not long before the search.266 The court said that it was applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard, but when weighing the evidence for and
against the gun being Ernest’s, it is very hard to conclude that the balance weighs in
favor of the government.267
Because Ernest could not definitively prove a negative – that the gun was not his
– there was “room” for the conclusion that it was. Thus, it is easy for “room thinking”
courts to conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate they are “truly” or
“altogether” innocent. But as Professor Keith Findlay explains, “to demand certainty
is to demand the impossible.”268 Our modern conception of innocence, if anything, is
more demanding now in a DNA world than it was in Borchard’s a century ago.269
One wonders whether this heavy burden of showing innocence is really what
Borchard had in mind. Recall that Borchard’s model innocent man was Andrew Toth.
How was he so sure that Toth was innocent? The evidence that led to his release was

261 Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 441.
262 Id. at 442.
263 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 733.
264 Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 437–39.
265 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 734.
266 Id. at 733–34.
267 Id. at 733.
268 Findley, supra note 73, at 1162.
269 Id. at 1188–89 (arguing that DNA evidence can mislead courts into thinking that it now
serves as the only conclusive evidence of innocence).
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the death bed confession of the actual killer.270 Isn’t there “room” to think that the
confession might be fabricated?271
Ultimately, weighing the evidence in these “room” cases and determining whether
the plaintiff has shown innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is, in close cases,
a sensitive and difficult judicial exercise. For example, in United States v. Holmes, the
plaintiff and a police officer offered competing narratives and the officer’s credibility
had not been challenged. A district judge was then found to have the discretion to
“credit either witness and to interpret the evidence either way.”272 Thus did the court
of appeals affirm the denial of a certificate of innocence of Michael Holmes, who is
listed on the National Registry of Exonerations.
When a court must weigh credibility in such close cases, it could rationally decide
for or against awarding a certificate of innocence. But, a “room thinking” court could
never do so because there would always be room to find the officer more credible than
the criminal defendant. That logic is inconsistent with the preponderance of evidence
standard. That standard does not require the plaintiff to rebut or clear the room of every
inculpatory fact. It instead requires him to demonstrate that it is more likely than not
that he did not commit the crime. That contemplates the possibility that there is
evidence consistent with guilt, but that other facts outweigh them.
The problem with “room thinking” is that it trains the court’s focus on evidence of
guilt and essentially presumes it in a way that effectively imposes a burden more
rigorous than that contemplated by the preponderance standard. There is no obvious
way to amend the statute to solve this problem. A possible solution, however, resides
in the recognition that courts have wide discretion to decide petitions for certificates
of innocence. An appropriate way to exercise that discretion while still remaining true
to the preponderance standard is to borrow the concept of burden shifting from Title
VII cases.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green273 the Supreme Court developed a
procedure to implement the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in Title VII employment
discrimination cases.274 The plaintiff has the initial burden of showing by a

270 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4.
271 Dying declarations are admissible in court as an exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(2). They are allowed because they are considered necessary and reliable.
See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (1985). However, dying declarations have been
questioned as unreliable since as early as 1877. Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1425
(2010) (reviewing critique of dying declarations).
272 Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2018); see Finley v. United States,
No. 07-cv-01939, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107006, at *27–28 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2008) (finding
that petitioner had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not have a willful
state of mind with respect to a fraud).
273 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
274 This has been replicated in other contexts as well. See Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168,
1171 (2020) (discrimination under ADEA’s federal sector provision); Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (explaining burden shifting in antitrust case); Morris v. Mathews,
106 S. Ct. 1032, 1038 (1986) (explaining burden shifting in double jeopardy cases); Metro.
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preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.275 This burden is
“not onerous,”276 but serves to “eliminate any non-discriminatory reasons” for the
action against the plaintiff.277 Put another way, the plaintiff must show that the act was
“more likely than not” due to discrimination.278 Satisfying it creates a presumption
that unlawful intentional discrimination has occurred.279 Given that presumption, if
the defendant fails to respond, the plaintiff prevails.280
Satisfying the prima facie case shifts the burden of production to the defendant to
set forth a non-discriminatory rationale for the employment decision.281 Because that
burden is of production, not persuasion, the defendant’s rationale need not be
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.282 If the defendant has satisfied its
burden of production by meeting the prima facie case with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff can respond in full,283 the presumption of discrimination disappears.284
The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff.285 The plaintiff is
provided a full and fair opportunity to shoulder its burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated rationale is actually a pretext for
unlawful discrimination.286 The plaintiff now must persuade the court either that “a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”287 Facts underlying the prima facie
case and inferences from those facts can be used at this stage.288
In this context, courts can operationalize this burden shifting paradigm by
imposing on plaintiffs the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case of

Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1997) (explaining burden shifting in workers’
compensation act claim).
275 McDonnell Douglass Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
276 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
277 Id. at 254.
278 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
279 Id.
280 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 256–58.
283 Id. at 255.
284 Id. at 253; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
285 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
286 Id. at 255–56.
287 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973)).
288 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
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innocence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on the reversal or acquittal.289 Nor would
it be sufficient simply to identify pre-existing or newly discovered weaknesses in the
government’s case, such as the recantation of witness testimony. Rather, the plaintiff
would be required to advance some affirmative evidence of factual innocence.
If the plaintiff is able to do so, the burden of production would then shift to the
government to refute that prima facie case by seeking to undercut the evidence of
innocence, to set forth existing or new evidence of guilt, or both. If the court concludes
that the evidence of innocence outweighs the evidence of guilt, it should issue the
certificate. If it is unconvinced, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to
attempt to rebut the government’s evidence of guilt and/or its arguments casting doubt
on the evidence of innocence.
The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout. The burden shifting
concept expands the court’s narrow focus on the remaining evidence of guilt and
whether the plaintiff can entirely explain it in a way that convinces the court that he
or she is altogether or truly innocent. The court’s attention returns to evaluating
whether plaintiff has established that it is more likely than not that they are innocent.
United States v. Herrera290 is an example of a case which could result in a different
outcome if burden shifting replaced room thinking. Herrera was tried and convicted
on two counts of bank robbery.291 Surveillance video showed a Hispanic man with
glasses and a Red Sox cap handing a teller a robbery note.292 As the video was
publicized, several people, including a jailer, Herrera’s cousin, and three tellers
recognized the man as Herrera and so testified.293
After Herrera was convicted and incarcerated, there was a very similar third Texas
bank robbery involving a Hispanic male with glasses and a different cap.294 A woman
called Crime Stoppers and said she had information that one of the earlier robberies
was committed by her boyfriend and his cousin, neither of whom were Herrera.295
Herrera filed a motion for a new trial and at a subsequent evidentiary hearing,
Herrera’s cousin withdrew her positive identification and the three tellers identified
the robber as someone much smaller than Herrera.296 The judge granted the motion

289 Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Abreu, No.
11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229911, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d
1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
290 United States v. Herrera, No. 10-CR-093, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167265 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
5, 2016).
291 Id. at *1.
292 Id. at *1–2.
293 Id. at *2.
294 Id. at *3.
295 Id.
296 Id. at *4.
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for a new trial, finding that Herrera would “probably” be innocent in light of the new
evidence, and he was not retried.297
Herrera petitioned for a certificate of innocence.298 The judge denied the petition,
using “room thinking.”299 The court properly reviewed the newly discovered
evidence.300 But, the judge concluded that the evidence did not exclude Herrera as the
robber.301 The court imposed on Herrera the burden of refuting all inculpatory
evidence and his failure to do so left the “room” necessary to deny the petition.302 The
court concluded that the “new physical evidence and testimony do not definitely
exclude Herrera, and there is still substantial evidence that implicates him as the
perpetrator.”303 The judge focused entirely on the “room,” and said there was
substantial evidence in it rather than remaining true to the preponderance standard.304
A burden shifting approach would require the court to look at the evidence from
different perspectives, rather than training its sights single-mindedly on demanding
that the plaintiff dispel all doubt of innocence. Herrera would need to first make a
prima facie case of innocence. Here, this would include evidence from the robber’s
boyfriend that he confessed to the crime. If that evidence is credible and reliable, the
burden would shift to the government to offer evidence of guilt. The focus of attention
and burden are now where they belong. What evidence of guilt remains? How
credible, reliable, and persuasive is that evidence?
If the evidence is sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s evidence of innocence, the
burden of production shifts to Herrera to counter the evidence of guilt. The court’s
ultimate task is not to determine whether Herrera has sufficient evidence to
“definitely” exclude him, but whether, on balance, the evidence of innocence
outweighs the evidence of guilt. “Room thinking” precludes evidence balancing. To
297 Id.
298 Id. at *5.
299 Id. at *8.
300 Id.
301 Id. at *10 (the photo of the robber in the third robbery was “ambiguous” and did not
“definitely depict” the person in the first two); id. at *11 (testimony of Herrera’s cousin and the
robber’s girlfriend does not “prove[] Herrera’s innocence); id. at *13 (discrepancy in physical
descriptions do not “definitively exclude” Herrera).
302 Id. at *14.
303 Id. at *15; see also United States v. Abreu, No. 11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
229911, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018) (“there is still room for the possibility that Defendant
committed the crime”), aff’d, 976 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
304 A similar case is United States v. Gaskins, 04-CR-379, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226175
(D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2019). Gaskins was convicted of drug conspiracy charges. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit held not merely that the evidence of guilt was insufficient, but that there was “no
affirmative evidence that Gaskins knowingly joined the narcotics conspiracy or had the specific
intent to further its aims.” United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The
District Court nevertheless denied the petition for a certificate of innocence holding that it was
more likely than not that “Gaskins knew of the conspiracy and participated in it anyway.”
Gaskins, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226175, at *10.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/5

42

2021]

ARE FEDERAL EXONEREES PAID?

261

be sure, it is possible that the court would come to the same conclusion, but it would
approach the question in the way commanded by the statute and by being faithful to
the preponderance standard.
I do not suggest that all courts are guilty of “room thinking.” Take the example of
Stephen Jones, one of the two men listed on the National Registry who were granted
federal certificates of innocence.305 A jury convicted Jones of possessing cocaine with
an intent to distribute and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.306 He later
moved to vacate his conviction on the ground that it rested largely on the testimony of
a police officer, Carr, who testified that he saw Jones with a bag of cocaine.307 Well
after the trial, Carr pled guilty to five felony counts relating to corruption in the course
of his duties as an officer.308 The United States joined the motion, and Jones’
judgment of conviction was vacated.309
Police obtained a search warrant to search Jones’ parents’ apartment based on
Carr’s affidavit that an informant told him that someone other than Jones was selling
cocaine from the apartment.310 When Carr did the search, he claimed to have seen
Jones there with cocaine.311 Jones had shown that he did not live in the apartment and,
without the officer’s testimony, there was no evidence that Jones possessed cocaine.312
The court held that:
While reversal of a conviction based on the insufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence is not enough to entitle a movant to a certificate of innocence, that
is not the case here. When the non-credible evidence is stripped away, all that
remains is the evidence of Jones’ presence at the apartment. That act,
however, was not a crime.313
“Room thinking” might lead a court to focus on the evidence of guilt from Carr
and to conclude that just because Carr was corrupt in his work on other cases, it does
not mean that he was lying in this case. His lack of credibility may justify setting aside
the conviction, but if Jones had the burden to clear the room of evidence of guilt, that

305 The opinion granting the petition for the other, Antonino Lyons, is United States v. Lyons,
726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
306 Maurice Possley, Stephen Jones, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3849
[https://perma.cc/UZ5J-ENJZ] (last updated Aug. 2, 2019).
307 Id.
308 Jones v. United States, No. 10-CV-1748, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51029, at *3–5 (E.D.
Mo. May 12, 2011).
309 Id.
310 Id. at *4–5.
311 Id. at *3.
312 Id. at *5.
313 Id. (citation omitted). As discussed above, if the court had regarded Jones’ presence at
the apartment as an “act” for purposes of Prong 2(A), the petition would have been denied.
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would require an admission from Carr that he had lied. Jones, instead, is an example
of unstated burden shifting. Jones offered evidence of innocence – that he did not live
in the apartment and so any cocaine there was not his. Indeed, police suspected that
another person was dealing drugs there.314 The burden of production then shifted to
the government to provide some credible and reliable evidence of guilt, and it could
not do so.315
3.

Prong 3

Prong 3 places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that “he did not by
misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.”316 It contemplates
that there are situations in which a wrongly convicted person who is undeniably
innocent of the acts charged or other offenses should nevertheless be denied
compensation. Prong 3 raises two important interpretive questions. First, what is the
nature of that disqualifying behavior? Second, what is the required causal connection
between it and the prosecution?
Unlike the other prongs, the 1938 statute used precisely the same language
Borchard drafted in 1912: “he has not either intentionally, or by willful misconduct,
or negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.”317 For reasons not
stated in the legislative history, the 1948 recodification arguably narrows the bar by
using the term “cause” rather than “contribute,” and “prosecution” rather than “arrest
or conviction.”
In Borchard’s survey of the European approaches to wrongful conviction
compensation, he noted that:
The statutes of some of the countries, such as Germany, Hungary, Norway,
and Sweden, specifically mention certain limitations in cases where the
detention or conviction may be said to have been due to the act of the claimant
himself – thus, for example, where there has been an attempt to flee, a false
confession, the removal of evidence, or an attempt to induce a witness or an
expert to give false testimony or opinion, or an analogous attempt to suppress
such testimony or opinion.318

314 Id.
315 United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010), the only other case
involving a successful claim for compensation under the federal statute, involved the same kind
of analysis. In Lyons, the government relied on evidence of Lyons’ being a drug dealer to
support its case that he had the intent required to commit a carjacking and engage in the sale of
counterfeit goods. When the drug charges, based largely on testimony from 26 jailhouse
snitches, were dismissed, the evidence supporting the intent required for the other crimes eroded
even though there might yet be room to find guilt. See id. at 1367–68.
316 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2).
317 18 U.S.C. § 730(c) (repealed 1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2)).
318 S. REP. NO. 74-2339 (1936); United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1947).
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Borchard adopted that bar, but his rationale was brief: “[t]his carries out simply
the equitable maxim that no one shall profit by his own wrong or come into court with
unclean hands.”319
There are, in these examples which I will call the “Borchard list,” two types of
disqualifying misconduct. The first are suspicious actions taken by an innocent person
that one would expect a guilty person would do during or after a crime (flee, remove
inculpatory evidence, induce false exculpatory evidence) to avoid detection or
conviction. The second are actions taken by an innocent person for the opposite reason
– to cast blame on themselves so as to take the fall for the actual culprit (false
confession, removal of exculpatory evidence, inducing false inculpatory testimony).
In both categories, the disqualifying acts need not themselves be crimes, but they
“mislead[] the authorities as to his culpability.”320
The problem with the Borchard list is two-fold. First, it does not seem to cover all
of the possible behaviors contemplated by the substantially broader language of the
statute. Surely, one could imagine forms of misconduct that arguably should be
disqualifying but which are not ones intended to mislead the authorities toward or
away from the plaintiff. Nor does the Borchard list include behavior that is negligent
rather than intentional, leaving it uncertain what that type of behavior might be.
Second, the Borchard list only includes conduct occurring after the alleged crime and
is closely tied to the crime. One might imagine disqualifying acts that occur before or
during the crime and that involve conduct separate and apart from the crime. This
mismatch between the Borchard list and the statutory language has been a source of
difficulty.
At the same time, the broad statutory language could be read to encompass acts or
omissions that appear suspicious (having a gun, driving a stolen car, being around
drugs, associating with criminals) and begin a chain of events that lead to prosecution.
After all, except in cases involving efforts to frame a person from the outset, there is
usually something that causes the future exoneree to first become a suspect and later
a criminal defendant. Viewed retrospectively, these acts appear innocent or
explainable. But, one can prospectively view those acts as misconduct or neglect that
caused the prosecution.
Worse are cases in which the conduct started a chain of events that included police
and/or prosecutorial misconduct. The statute does not by its terms qualify the term
“prosecution” with words like “fair,” “just,” “proper,” or “lawful.” As discussed
further below, sometimes government misconduct is the proximate or supervening
cause of the prosecution, not the future plaintiff’s neglect or misconduct. But the
statute does not define “cause.”
Let’s begin with the nature and scope of “misconduct.” Recall the Betts case, the
one involving the lawyer convicted of criminal contempt when he failed to attend a
court hearing.321 He knew when the hearing was and wrote a letter to the judge saying

319 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 32 (1912).

OF

STATE INDEMNITY

FOR

ERRORS

OF

320 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1993).
321 Id.
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that he and his client could not attend.322 Later, Betts did not show up to his show
cause order because he was hiding in another county to avoid an arrest warrant.323
And, he did not show up for a rescheduled hearing.324
Betts could not have handled this situation worse and his prosecution hardly seems
unjustified. But, the Seventh Circuit earlier vacated his conviction and found him
innocent on grounds that make his behavior seem at least somewhat less
blameworthy.325 Some might think it was unfair to deny him a certificate of innocence.
Yet, a fair reading of the misconduct provision points in the other direction.
The Seventh Circuit seized on the Keegan court’s view that the language of the
provision was “rather indefinite.”326 In order to understand the contours of
disqualifying misconduct, the court examined the Borchard list327 and described it as
barring compensation for those who would “have acted or failed to act in such a way
as to mislead the authorities into thinking he had committed the offense” or who have
“it within his means to avoid prosecution but elects not to do so, instead acting in such
a way as to ensure it.”328 Betts’ failure to timely alert the court that he would not attend
and his failure to attend these hearings were not designed to cast blame on another or
himself.329
This narrow interpretation of misconduct makes the Prong 3 analysis much easier
for courts. The Betts court wanted to avoid having “to assess the virtue of a petitioner’s
behavior even when it does not amount to a criminal offense.”330 There is no reason
to make moral judgments that distinguish misconduct from something less. Moreover,
the Betts court suggested that Prong 3’s disqualifying neglect or misconduct cannot be
the alleged criminal act itself, of which the plaintiff has been proven innocent.331
Rather, the disqualifying misconduct has to be something separate and apart from the
acts underlying the crime itself, like those actions in the Borchard list.332
322 Id. at 1280.
323 Id. at 1281.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 1284 (quoting United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)).
327 Id. at 1285 (quoting Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 638).
328 Id. (“[T]here must be either an affirmative act or an omission by the petitioner that
misleads the authorities as to his culpability.”).
329 Id. at 1285–86.
330 Id. at 1285.
331 Id. As the dissent in Graham put it, “[i]t must follow that to give meaning to all of the
words in the statute, one cannot ‘cause’ one’s own prosecution by engaging in the very conduct
which was found to be non-criminal in the first part of the inquiry.” United States v. Graham,
608 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (Gregory, J., dissenting).
332 Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285; Graham, 608 F.3d at 181 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (interpreting
Betts as requiring “additional misconduct” that misleads the authorities).
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The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Graham,333 however, took a much different
approach.334 Graham was the Executive Director of several non-profits focused on the
aging.335 His employment contract permitted him to convert his sick leave into cash
if he became ill or his contract ended.336 In 2003, Graham asked the Board to convert
some sick leave to cash without satisfying either condition. The Board, whose
members had an average age of over 80, agreed.337 Graham converted additional sick
leave hours to cash on his own in 2004.338 The Board found out and ordered Graham
to return the funds, which he did.339 He was later indicted on 39 counts of fraud, tax
violations, and embezzlement.340
Following a bench trial, Graham was acquitted on all counts except the charge of
embezzlement arising from the 2004 sick leave conversion.341 The court acquitted him
of the 2003 conversion on the ground that his request for Board approval undercut his
intent to steal.342 Presumably, if he intended to steal, he would not have raised the
issue with the Board.343 Such, though, was the scenario with the 2004 conversion.344
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction on appeal.345 It reasoned that since the
Board had in 2003 permitted him to cash in his sick leave, Graham’s subsequent cashout without Board approval was also insufficient to demonstrate an intent to steal.346
The Board effectively altered the terms of his employment contract. Graham then
sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied by the district court.347 It reasoned

333 Graham, 608 F.3d 164.
334 See Amy Oxley, Not Innocent Enough: The Denial of a Certificate of Innocence Based
on Neglect in United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2010), 36 S. ILL. U. L.J.
425, 426 (2012).
335 Graham, 608 F.3d at 166.
336 Id. at 167.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 United States v. Graham, No. CRIM 506-00025, 2006 WL 2527613, at *5 (S.D.W. Va.
Aug. 30, 2006).
342 Id. at *1.
343 Id.
344 Id. at *3.
345 United States v. Graham, 269 F. App'x 281, 282 (4th Cir. 2008).
346 Id. at 286.
347 United States v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S.D.W. Va. 2008).
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that Graham’s actions constituted neglect and that brought about his prosecution.348
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.349
Based on a plain reading of the statute, it is not hard to see why. The court did not
cite the Borchard list and try to shoehorn what Graham did into one of those examples.
The court hewed closely instead to what Congress actually wrote.350 Contrary to the
court in Betts, the Court held that the statute’s use of the terms misconduct or neglect
required it to make a moral assessment about the petitioner’s behavior.351
Although one could view Graham’s conduct as misconduct, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the district court that Graham’s self-dealing constituted “neglect.”352 This
is just not the sort of thing that non-profit directors should be doing; he lined his
pockets at the expense of his organization. On the other hand, the basis for the
determination of innocence was that Graham’s board permitted him to do what he
did.353 Perhaps Graham took advantage of an unsophisticated, older, and trusting
board, but he did ask for permission which resulted in a de facto amendment to his
contract.354
The majority opinion in Graham rejected the notion advanced by the dissent and
suggested in Betts that the disqualifying misconduct be something separate and apart
from the acts charged.355 Graham’s distasteful but non-criminal self-dealing was
squarely part and parcel of what the government charged. The majority said that if the
disqualifying misconduct had to be something different from the charged acts, then
the statute would have included language like “separate,” “other,” additional,” or
“subsequent,” so indicating.356
The Fourth Circuit’s dilemma was the one that the Betts court tried to avoid. The
Betts court acknowledged that Betts’ behavior was not “upstanding” and not “fitting
behavior for an officer of the court.”357 It did not want to get into the business of
finding misconduct in questionable but legal behavior because doing so might yield
an uncomfortable conclusion that entirely lawful conduct can be disqualifying.358 The
348 Id. at 686.
349 United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2010).
350 Id. at 171.
351 Id. at 173–74.
352 Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
353 See Oxley, supra note 334, at 440.
354 Graham, 608 F.3d at 169.
355 Id. at 175–76.
356 Id. at 175.
357 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1993).
358 To be sure, that behavior also has to cause the prosecution. When that behavior is the
basis for the prosecution, that is a hard conclusion to avoid. The Betts court tried, in dicta, to
say that it was not the proximate cause of the prosecution. That was the misreading of the order
to command his presence in court on a particular date and time. Id. at 1285–86.
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Fourth Circuit held, in effect, that the statute required it to assess the plaintiff’s moral
virtue and, once it did, the statute gave it no choice but to find that Graham lost on
Prong 3.
United States v. Valle359 followed the Graham approach. Valle was a New York
police officer who, over an extended period of time, discussed with others on the Dark
Web his ideas to kidnap and sexually torture his wife and other women.360 He was
convicted on conspiracy to kidnap, but the court set aside the conviction for lack of
sufficient evidence.361 The court held that no reasonable juror could regard these
conversations as reflective of actual intent rather than fantasy role playing, or could
reasonably conclude that these conversations culminated in an actual plan to
kidnap.362 Valle sought a certificate of innocence.363
If the word “misconduct” means anything at all, it has to cover Valle’s horrible
actions. No difficult moral lines need be drawn here. Any reasonable judge would
recoil at having to grant someone like Valle a certificate of innocence. It is therefore
not surprising that the court rejected Valle’s argument that the court should follow
Betts and require the disqualifying misconduct to be something separate and apart
from the acts charged.364 The Valle court instead followed Graham, making the result
an easy one – Valle’s vile behavior resulted in his prosecution.365
The Valle court took comfort that in many cases, it would not be necessary to make
these virtue assessments. One example is that no moral judgment would be needed
“where a defendant is convicted based on the perjured testimony of a cooperating
witness or law enforcement officer.” 366 That example, though, confuses the concepts
of misconduct and causation. The misconduct of third parties or the government may
be the proximate cause of the prosecution (or conviction) and thus make the lack of
causation easier to prove by the plaintiff. But, Prong 3 requires the court to focus
initially on the behavior of the plaintiff, not others.

359 United States v. Valle, 467 F. Supp. 3d 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y.).
360 Id.
361 Id. at 200.
362 Id. at 199.
363 The Court held that Valle met Prong 2 because “it is more likely than not the case that
Valle is innocent of the kidnapping conspiracy charge. . . .” Id. at 203. The Court misreads
Prong 2(A). The question is not whether he is innocent of the crime, but whether he committed
any of the acts charged. Here, those acts would certainly have included engaging in these
horrible conversations. The Mills court would have had no difficulty rejecting the petition on
that ground.
364 Id. at 205.
365 Id. at 208–09.
366 Id. at 205.
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An example is Gates v. District of Columbia,367 a case in which the plaintiff sought
compensation under the D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Act.368 Gates alleged and a jury
later agreed that two police officers induced a snitch to falsely testify that he heard
Gates confess the crime to him, exactly the scenario noted in Valle.369
The D.C. Act precludes compensation for those who “by his or her misconduct,
cause or bring about his or her own prosecution.”370 In Gates, the defendant had
attempted to snatch the purse of a young woman in the same area in which a
subsequent rape and murder of another young woman had occurred.371 That earlier
crime made Gates a suspect in the latter.372 The District of Columbia argued that there
was a causal connection between the earlier crime and Gates’ prosecution for the
rape/murder that he did not commit.373 Thus, it argued, Gates failed Prong 3.
In Gates, the government pointed to disqualifying misconduct separate and apart
from the acts underlying the crime charged and behavior not on the Borchard list.374
While Graham held that the statute did not require the alleged misconduct to be
separate from the crime, it did not hold that it may not be independent.375 With respect
to causation, but for Gates’ earlier nearby purse snatching, he would not have appeared
on the police radar, and if that had not triggered suspicion, he would not have been
prosecuted.
Just as Valle is the sort of person one would not want to compensate, Gates is
precisely the sort of person one would. As a result of police misconduct, he was
incarcerated for twenty-seven years for a rape and murder that DNA analysis
concluded he did not commit.376 But, the two cases could have come out the same
way. The statute does not distinguish between cases in which the alleged misconduct
is part and parcel of the crime for which the person is innocent (Graham, Valle) and
those in which it is separate and apart (Gates).
The court in Gates could have solved this problem by relying on causation. Gates’
purse-snatching did not cause his prosecution; the police misconduct was the
supervening cause that did. Betts makes the same sort of point. Betts did not cause his

367 Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2014). In the interest of full
disclosure, the author was one of the attorneys representing Mr. Gates.
368 The version of the Unjust Imprisonment Act in place during the Gates litigation may be
found at D.C. CODE § 2-421(2020).
369 Complaint at ¶ 6–7, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10).
370 D.C. CODE § 2-422(a)(4) (2020). The D.C. Act differs from the federal statute only by
omitting the words “or neglect.”
371 Complaint at ¶ 31, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10).
372 Id. at ¶ 32.
373 Id.
374 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 15–16.
375 Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 2010)).
376 Complaint at ¶ 1, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10).
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prosecution; the government’s misreading of the unclear court order regarding the
hearing date did.377 But, the Gates court did not do that.
The district court rejected the District’s argument, but not because, as Valle
suggests, it was unnecessary in wrongful conviction cases involving police
misconduct to assess whether the earlier crime was misconduct. Instead, the Gates
court held that the prior crime did not “establish any of the essential elements of the
charges in [the] rape and murder,” and that the “past crimes were not part of the same
enterprise of illegal activity.”378 The court identified the type of misconduct that the
D.C. Council suggested would be disqualifying.379 Relying on caselaw developed
under Section 2513, and referring to the Borchard list of disqualifying misconduct, the
court held that a prior crime fell outside that list.380 Instead, it was “separate and
distinct” from the crime for which Gates was convicted and occurred outside “the time
of the crime at issue or immediately afterwards.”381 Thus, it could not serve as a basis
for disqualifying misconduct. The logic was opposite of that of Betts. While Graham
and Valle suggest that the disqualifying misconduct can be part of the crime, Gates
held that it must be.382
The court was worried that the District's reading of “misconduct” would yield a
conclusion that “anyone who has been rightfully convicted or arrested of a crime in
the past is no longer able to recover.”383 That’s not a fair slippery slope conclusion to
draw. This was not a case in which Gates’ general rap sheet caused him to be
prosecuted. The real question is the required causal connection between the
misconduct and the prosecution. And there was such a connection, although the
intervening police misconduct broke it in Gates.384
Limiting an interpretation of the statute to the Borchard list – acts that mislead
authorities as to one’s culpability – might not be entirely satisfactory either. A classic
act that misleads police in this way is featured in every police show: not talking to the

377 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285–86 (7th Cir. 1993).
378 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
379 “Congress intended [the federal statute] to preclude a certificate [of actual innocence]
‘[w]here there has been an attempt to flee, a false confession, the removal of evidence, or an
attempt to induce a witness or an expert to give false testimony or opinion, or an analogous
attempt to suppress such testimony or opinion.’” Id. (citing Graham, 608 F.3d at 173–74)
(alteration in original).
380 Id.
381 Id. at 16.
382 For a case following Gates, see Ruffin v. United States, 135 A.3d 799 (D.C. 2016).
383 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 16.
384 In the Gates case, there were allegations, proven at trial, that the chain of causation was
effectively superseded by several acts of police misconduct that were the proximate cause of
Gates’ prosecution. Id. at 8.
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police. Eastridge v. United States385 is, in part, an example. Three men and Jones were
convicted of stabbing a man to death.386 Of the three, one had passed away in prison,
and the other two, Eastridge and Sousa, were found innocent following a habeas
proceeding.387 The United States, however, argued that their ties to Jones and the
crime constituted disqualifying misconduct.388 Those connections included helping
Jones escape, refusing to reveal any information about the murder in keeping with a
“Pagan Code,” and concealing knives.389
These are tenable arguments, but this case also involved a situation in which
“[p]etitioners sat in prison for decades after a prosecution with shifting theories and
an unconstitutional vise that severely restricted their trial defense. . . . It would make
a mockery of the Unjust Conviction Act if these Petitioners were denied a remedy for
the unrelated misconduct upon which the Government rests its argument.”390
The statute, though, could have been so interpreted.
One might argue that there was a causal connection between their failure to provide
potentially exculpatory information and their prosecution. After all, they had the
means to avoid prosecution, perhaps by fingering Jones and/or offering an alibi, but
intentionally chose not to deploy them. Asserting one’s Fifth Amendment rights, even
if doing so is in keeping with some “Pagan Code,” is perhaps not misconduct, but it
misleads police every day into thinking that the person might be culpable. It may be
that their silence drew the suspicion of the police and was a factor in the decision to
prosecute.
The court avoided that result by holding, like Gates, that none of their “actions or
omissions was related to the charged crime.”391 In particular, the court acknowledged
that helping the murderer escape was a closer question, but suggested that, since there
was no evidence that the men knew Jones killed the victim, driving him was not
misconduct.392 But, in reality, these acts and omissions were related to the murder,
more closely than Gates’ purse snatching was related to the later rape and murder for
which he was wrongly convicted.
Again, the result seems to be a good one. These men were innocent of murder, but
they had certain connections to it that made them “murder adjacent.” The court
understandably explains why they were exonerated in the first place.393 In light of the
exoneration, these actions which may have appeared suspicious when the crime was
385 Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Diamen
v. United States, 604 F.3d 653 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
386 Id. at 68.
387 Eastridge v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005).
388 Eastridge, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 73.
391 Id. at 71.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 72.
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investigated now appear innocent and unrelated. But, the statute’s focus on what
actually caused the prosecution does not appear to contemplate this sort of
retrospective logic.
Even more difficult are cases in which it is shown that either 1) no crime actually
occurred or 2) the plaintiff can show innocence by a preponderance of the evidence,
but the potentially disqualifying acts of misconduct or negligence are related to the
charged crime. In both, almost by definition, there is some inculpatory evidence.
Either that evidence, which looks suspicious, does not add up to a criminal act, or
innocence is established because that evidence is outweighed by exculpatory facts. If
the existence of those suspicious inculpatory facts alone causes the plaintiff to fail
Prong 3, then a lot of innocent people would not be compensated.
At bottom, Prong 3 must be handled with care because, when it applies, it denies
compensation to people who have demonstrated their innocence. The language of the
statute does not distinguish between cases like Valle and Gates that rest on the polar
opposites of Borchard’s conception of the “deserving.” Thus, again, courts have dealt
with the statute by inconsistently employing extra-statutory concepts like virtue
assessment, the relationship between the alleged conduct and the crime, and notions
of causation to arrive at results they regard as just.
V. ABU-SHAWISH TO THE RESCUE
As we have seen, the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute has a long
and checkered history. It is plagued by statutory language that is either unexplained or
erroneously described in the legislative history, and by interpretations of that language
which adhere to it but are bad policy, or are unfaithful to it and reflective of sound
policy. Together, the statute has become at least partly unmoored from even
Borchard’s limited vision of its scope. The remarkable and unusual case of Mhammad
Abu-Shawish offers an interesting opportunity to stress-test the statute and to rethink
it.
Mhammad Abu-Shawish was the executive director of Arabian Fest/American
Festival, Inc, a non-profit organization that hoped to redevelop a portion of
Milwaukee’s Muskego Avenue.394 In 2001, his organization sought a grant to research
and prepare a development proposal from a Milwaukee city entity that distributed
block grant funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.395
Abu-Shawish’s organization received $75,000.396
About a year later, Abu-Shawish submitted his redevelopment plan to the city.397
The problem was that the plan was almost identical to another plan prepared for a
different Milwaukee non-profit.398 Because HUD had paid for a proposal that AbuShawish seemingly did not prepare, he was charged with federal program fraud. 399 18
394 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2007).
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 552–53.
398 Id. at 553.
399 Id.
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U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) prohibits theft from organizations receiving federal assistance
funds, here, the City of Milwaukee.400
In 2005, following a trial before Judge J.P. Stadtmueller in which he testified on
his own behalf, a federal jury found Abu-Shawish guilty and he was sentenced to three
years in prison.401 On appeal, Abu-Shawish argued that the statute he was convicted
of violating required that the defendant be an agent of the defrauded entity.402 His
argument was simple – because he was not an agent of the City of Milwaukee, he
could not have violated this statute.403 The Seventh Circuit agreed, and his conviction
was vacated.404 By this time, he had already served his sentence.405
With a measure of judicial exasperation, the court concluded that the government
charged Abu-Shawish with the wrong crime.406 The court flatly concluded that the
evidence did show that he defrauded Milwaukee.407 It wondered whether he should
have instead been prosecuted for mail or wire fraud.408 Not surprisingly, federal
prosecutors took the hint, and indicted him for mail and wire fraud and transporting
money obtained fraudulently.409 This time, following a 2008 trial in which he did not
testify, Abu-Shawish was acquitted.410
At first glance, from a compensatory perspective, this case looks like a long-shot.
First, his conviction for a federal fraud charge was reversed on grounds that the
legislative history specifically regarded as “technical” or “procedural.” The indictment
was faulty; it charged him with a crime that he could not have committed because his
status did not satisfy one of the essential elements of the crime.
Second, at Abu-Shawish’s sentencing hearing in which the court considered a
sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, Judge Statmueller, who fifteen years
later would decide Abu-Shawish’s petition for a certificate of innocence, savaged his
credibility. Stating that Abu-Shawish’s conduct “just defies all reality,” the judge
regarded him as a “prevaricator, someone who will twist the acts to meet his view of
what the law ought to be.”411 For Judge Stadtmueller, this was “not even a close
400 Id. at 553–54.
401 Id. at 553.
402 Id. at 555.
403 Id.
404 Id. at 558.
405 United States v. Abu-Shawish 898 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2018).
406 Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d at 558.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 732.
410 Id.
411 United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *22.
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020).
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question,” even though he thought the Seventh Circuit might come to a different
view.412 The Seventh Circuit, though, did more than hint that Abu-Shawish was guilty
of different sorts of frauds, for which he was later charged, but acquitted.
Third, there was essentially no dispute that he committed the acts for which he was
twice charged. That fundamental act was submitting a plan for which his organization
was given a grant that was nearly identical to a plan furnished by another group. His
claim of innocence rested on grounds of intent: that he did not intend to defraud.413
His burden was a difficult one because he must prove a negative – that he lacked
fraudulent intent.
Fourth, given that he did submit this plagiarized plan, he would seemingly have to
wrestle with the question of whether his misconduct or neglect caused his prosecution.
Despite these apparently insurmountable hurdles, Abu-Shawish won a certificate of
innocence.414
In 2014, Abu-Shawish undertook a convoluted procedural path to obtain a
certificate of innocence.415 In 2015, he petitioned for a certificate of innocence in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court of conviction.416
In 2017, the district court dismissed his petition without even waiting for the
government to respond, much less holding an evidentiary hearing.417 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute and
reversed on procedural grounds.418 It held that the district court imposed too high a
pleading standard on Abu-Shawish, erroneously requiring him to offer in his
complaint evidence of innocence when Rule 8 only required him to allege it.419 It
ordered the district court to proceed to the merits and to allow both sides to present
evidence.420
The Seventh Circuit took a tour through the legislative history of the statute and,
like courts before it, noted that “the statute’s distinction between acquittal and
innocence as setting a high bar for petitioners.”421 It quoted from the House Report
that “[t]he claimant cannot be one whose innocence is based on technical or procedural

412 Id.
413 Id. at *23.
414 On September 14, 2020, the United States appealed that award to the Seventh Circuit.
United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 20-2748 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020). It dismissed the appeal
on October 16, 2020 after consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General. Docket 4, AbuShawish, No. 20-2748 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2020).
415 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 228 F. Supp. 3d 878, 881 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
416 Id. at 880.
417 Id. at 881–82.
418 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 740 (7th Cir. 2018).
419 Id. at 737–38.
420 Id. at 738.
421 Id. at 735.
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grounds, such as lack of sufficient evidence, or a faulty indictment.”422 It repeated the
notion that Congress did not intend that every person whose conviction was set aside
to be compensated.423 It noted that Abu-Shawish had the burden of production and
persuasion.424 It said that the statute is strictly interpreted as a waiver of sovereign
immunity.425 History was not on Abu-Shawish’s side either; only in Betts had a court
reversed the denial of a petition for a certificate of innocence. It did all the table-setting
courts do when they are poised to deny a petition for a certificate of innocence.
Still, although it is a steep climb for people like Abu-Shawish, the Seventh Circuit
held that it was wrong for the district court not to let Abu-Shawish try.426 While it had
wide discretion in the absence of statutory procedures to craft a process for deciding
the petition, it could not simply dismiss it when it satisfied Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8’s pleading requirements. The court then proceeded to the prongs of proof.
A. Prong 1
Abu-Shawish is a very unusual case. In virtually all cases, after a conviction is
reversed, the government will either drop the charges or retry them. Here, because
Abu-Shawish was initially charged, tried, and convicted of a crime the elements of
which could not fit the undisputed facts, the government retried him for violating
different criminal statutes that it believed better fit those facts.
This odd scenario requires us to pause at Prong 1. This is a Prong 1(A) case. The
crime for which he was wrongly convicted was federal program fraud. Had AbuShawish been retried and acquitted for that crime, Prong 1(B) would surely apply.
But, here, he was found not guilty on retrial not of the crime for which his conviction
was reversed, but of different ones.427 Looking at Prong 1(A), the Seventh Circuit
quickly found it to have been satisfied because his conviction “was reversed on the
merits.”428
The court’s interpretation of Prong 1 was not faithful to the language of the statute.
The question that the statute poses is not whether the reversal was “on the merits,” but
whether the conviction was set aside on the ground that he was “not guilty of the
offense of which he was convicted.” Was this the case for Abu-Shawish?
On one hand, this seems an easier case than Maria Hernandez’s. Her conviction
was reversed on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, a rationale grounded in her
right to a fair trial, not on her guilt or innocence. For the drafters of the 1948 statute
and the court in Hernandez interpreting it, the basis for the reversal was insufficiently
connected to her substantive guilt or innocence to welcome her into the ranks of the

422 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938)).
423 Id. at 735.
424 Id. at 733.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 738.
427 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1)’s Prong B says that “on new trial or rehearing he was found not
guilty of such offense” (emphasis added). He was not tried for “such offense.”
428 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2018).
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potentially deserving. She got off on a procedural technicality; she might have still
done the crime.
In contrast, Abu-Shawish could never have committed the crime of federal
program fraud because the undisputed evidence was that he was not employed by the
defrauded party, a prerequisite to conviction under the statute.429 His guilt, like that
of Betts, was a legal impossibility. Thus, it could be concluded that his conviction was
set aside on the “ground that he is not guilty of the offense.” The Seventh Circuit could
have said that, but it did not.
On the other hand, a less forgiving court could conclude that his conviction was
not set aside on grounds that he was not guilty, but on grounds that the indictment was
faulty. Thus, Abu-Shawish falls within the disfavored class of persons specifically
mentioned in the legislative history who benefited from a technical reversal.430
Cummings would view Abu-Shawish as someone whose conviction was reversed on
whether “the facts charged and proven constituted an offense under some statute.”431
Like Hernandez, his conviction was set aside not because of his innocent actions, but
the blameworthy actions of a third party – for Hernandez, her poor lawyer, and for
Abu-Shawish, his prosecutor charging the wrong crime.
On balance, this latter argument should not carry the day. It was particularly
unlikely in the Seventh Circuit, which has held that reversals of convictions for failure
of proof, also specifically mentioned as technical or procedural in the legislative
history,432 nevertheless satisfy Prong 1.433 Abu-Shawish rightly survived Prong 1, but
his path to success was not quite as straightforward as the court made it seem and
might not have been possible outside the Seventh Circuit.
B.

Prong 2: And/Or

That brings us to Prong 2 and requires a brief re-examination of the “and/or”
problem in the statute discussed above. With respect to innocence, what does AbuShawish have to prove? Prong 2(A) requires him to prove that he did not commit “any
of the acts charged.” The federal program charge or the mail fraud charge? Or both?
Alternatively, or in addition, does he have to show that he did not commit any
uncharged offenses? Prong 2(A) and/or Prong 2(B)?
This does not seem like a difficult question. One asks for a certificate of innocence
of crimes for which one was wrongly convicted and imprisoned. That would be the

429 United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *2.
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020).
430 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938) (listing “faulty indictment” as the type of reversal
that does not prove innocence).
431 Id. at 3.
432 Id. at 2.
433 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 984 (7th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff was charged
with attempting to export defense articles without a license. His conviction was reversed when
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that
he knew that the items in question were defense articles or that licenses were required to export
them.
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federal program fraud charge for which Abu-Shawish was imprisoned for three years
and, thus, if successful, would entitle him to receive about $150,000. He would have
to show, in Prong 2(A), that he did not commit any of the acts charged in the federal
program fraud indictment.
That would seem close to impossible because he did commit the key act charged
– submitting the report.434 But, a court in the Seventh Circuit (like the Eastern District
of Wisconsin), bound to follow Betts, would (mis)interpret “acts” as “crime,”
conclude that, like Betts, Abu-Shawish’s conviction was a legal impossibility, that he
was necessarily innocent of that charge, and that Prong 2(A) was therefore satisfied.
If he need only prove Prong 2(A), Abu-Shawish moves on to Prong 3 without ever
having to prove innocence of mail fraud and similar crimes.
Recall that Borchard’s original proposal would have required Abu-Shawish to
prove that he was innocent of the act charged and other offenses against the United
States. However, the statute that emerged said “or” instead.435 The odd posture of the
Abu-Shawish case highlights the wisdom of Borchard’s conjunctive requirement. He
viewed the deserving as those innocent of the crime for which they were wrongly
convicted (here, federal program fraud) and of any other related crimes (here, mail
fraud). He would not be happy that the eventual statute appears to be unintentionally
helpful to Abu-Shawish. What did the Seventh Circuit have to say about this?
Although it is not completely free from doubt, the court seemed to have interpreted
Abu-Shawish’s burden consistent with what the statute should have said, not what it
actually did say. The court decided “Abu-Shawish’s claim will succeed or fail based
on the second requirement – whether his actions constituted any crime under federal
or state law.”436 It appears to suggest that Abu-Shawish has to prove innocence of any
crime, charged or uncharged, relating to his Milwaukee grant.
Thus, it seems that Abu-Shawish’s burden on remand was demonstrating that he
satisfied Prong 2(B). However, is that because it was clear to the court that he had or
could easily satisfy Prong 2(A), using Betts, and that he must also satisfy Prong 2(B)
(supporting a conjunctive interpretation)? Or, is that because Abu-Shawish could not
satisfy Prong 2(A) and thus had to satisfy Prong 2(B) (supporting a disjunctive
interpretation)? The court does not say, but if the court had Betts in mind, the former
possibility is more likely than the latter.437 The Seventh Circuit again read the statute
in a manner that makes sense as a matter of policy, but not as a matter of sound
statutory interpretation.

434 See Indictment at ¶ 18, United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-cr-00211 (E.D. Wis. Oct.
7, 2003), ECF No. 6.
435 Most courts have interpreted Prong 2 in the disjunctive. See United States v. Mills, 773
F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 2014); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 841 (5th Cir. 1963). But
see Hadley v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 140, 141–42 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
436 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2018). See Report and
Recommendation Granting Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 17, United States v. AbuShawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017), ECF No. 344 [hereinafter Abu-Shawish
R. & R.]. Note that the court uses the word “crime” that is not in the statute.
437 But see Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 17–18 (stating that Prong 2(A) and
Prong 2(B) are phrased in the disjunctive).
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Prong 2: Room/Preponderance

The district court had no occasion to wrestle with this problem. The parties briefed
this as a Prong 2(B) case – whether he showed by a preponderance of the evidence
that his acts or omissions did not constitute mail fraud.438 In his opening brief in
support of his Petition for a Certificate of Innocence, Abu-Shawish argued that fraud
requires proof of specific intent that he did not have.439 On the surface, demonstrating
innocence through lack of intent seems particularly difficult. Claims of lack of intent
turn on questions of knowledge and motive and thus, on the credibility of the actor.
These types of cases would seem particularly susceptible to “room thinking” because
dents in credibility and inferences drawn from logic can leave room for the possibility
of guilt. That certainly seemed to be the case here where Abu-Shawish’s credibility
was seriously doubted by the court.
Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph held an evidentiary hearing on July 30, 2019
during which Abu-Shawish testified.440 She reviewed the transcripts of both trials,
received evidence submitted by the parties, and issued her Report and
Recommendation on December 10, 2019.441 She and Judge Stadtmueller, who
reviewed her Report and Recommendation, focused on whether Abu-Shawish was
innocent of mail fraud and transporting goods fraud, with a particular eye as to whether
he had specific intent to defraud by plagiarizing the report.442
Judge Stadtmueller could have easily rested on his prior doubts about AbuShawish’s credibility and, in them, found the room necessary to deny the petition on
the ground that Abu-Shawish had failed to demonstrate that he was “truly” or
“entirely” innocent of fraud. But, he did not:
This Court has repeatedly – and reasonably expressed serious incredulity
about Abu-Shawish’s version of the events. But even if Abu-Shawish’s
testimony is appropriately considered through the lens of extreme skepticism,
the surrounding evidence corroborates it.443
Relying on the evidence in the 2008 trial, Judge Stadtmueller ultimately concluded
to apparently his own surprise, that “against all odds, Abu-Shawish has demonstrated

438 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 12,
United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2017), ECF No. 330; see
also Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 19.
439 I’m ignoring the crime of transporting more than $5,000 obtained by fraud in foreign
commerce. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Petition for Certificate of Innocence, supra
note 438, at 12.
440 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 5.
441 Abu-Shawish R. & R, supra note 436.
442 Id. at 18–19; United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132322, at *4 (E.D. Dist. Wis. July 27, 2020).
443 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *26.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that he is innocent of any crime involving fraud,
deprivation, or misappropriation of property.”444
To see how Abu-Shawish snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, more
background is needed. Abu-Shawish led the annual Arabian Fest cultural event in
Milwaukee, and it was quite successful.445 He wanted to use a portion of Muskego
Avenue as a destination place for a thriving Arab-American business community. He
pitched the idea to a new alderman, Donovan, who liked the idea and suggested that
he seek a grant.446 At the same time, Donovan was the founder of his own non-profit,
Milwaukee Alliance, and aspired to redevelop a larger portion of Muskego Avenue.447
One of Milwaukee Alliance’s employees, Sanfilippo, contacted a professor, Roth,
to write a plan for the revitalization of the area.448 Not surprisingly, given their mutual
interests, the paths of Roth and Abu-Shawish crossed, and they attended meetings
together.449 During this research phase, Donovan assigned Sanfilippo and her cousin
to help Abu-Shawish with the project to develop a business plan to recruit new
businesses to Muskego Avenue for which he had received a $75,000 grant from the
city.450
Ultimately, Roth finished his 35-page report for circulation and included
information that Sanfilippo had compiled under Abu-Shawish’s supervision.451 Roth
was not enthusiastic about an Arabic business center in a Hispanic neighborhood, so
his report spoke more generally of an international business district.452 Sanfilippo
received the report and shared it with Donovan.453 Donovan thought that the report
focused too much on Milwaukee Alliance interests and too little on those of other
stakeholders in the redevelopment plan. So, at his direction, Sanfilippo edited it and
made it more general so that other groups could use the plan.454 The edited report was
apparently reduced to twenty-two pages and did not specifically mention the ArabAmerican business center Abu-Shawish championed.455

444 Id. at *37.
445 Id. at *9; see also Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 6.
446 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 7.
447 Id.
448 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *10.
449 Id. at *11; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 8, 10.
450 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *11–13.
451 Id. at *15–16. Roth was paid from a city HUD grant through Milwaukee Alliance.
452 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 12.
453 Id.
454 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *16–17.
455 Id. at *17.
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Donovan told Sanfilippo to send the report to Abu-Shawish, which she did.456
Abu-Shawish did not look at the report for several months; he spent time on other
aspects of redevelopment planning.457 When he did look at the report, he testified that
he thought it was Sanfilippo’s final draft.458 Still, it did not mention Arabian Fest, so
Abu-Shawish made a few small changes to it, such as adding references to Arabian
Fest, and submitted it to the City.459
Although the court did not explicitly use a burden shifting analysis, its reasoning
was consistent with such an approach. Abu-Shawish could show innocence if he were
able to demonstrate that he did not know that Roth was preparing a report for another
group, and that he had not seen the Roth report prior to submitting his own on behalf
of Arabian Fest.460 A prima facie case would require Abu-Shawish to advance
credible evidence of this lack of knowledge. He testified to that effect at his trial and
at the evidentiary hearing.461
The burden then shifted to the government. The Government’s argument was that
assessing Abu-Shawish’s claims of lack of intent turn on his credibility. It contended
that a prior conviction for mortgage fraud and suggestions by the trial judge in his
federal program fraud trial that he likely obstructed justice by lying in his testimony
shattered his credibility.462 As a result, the Government argued that Abu-Shawish’s
assertions of a lack of culpable intent should be disregarded.463 Without them, the
substantial similarity between the Roth report and his submission and the fact that the
men met and worked together on this project permit an inference that Abu-Shawish
took the Roth report and passed it off as his own.464 That would shift the burden back
to Abu-Shawish. The court said repeatedly that his burden was to demonstrate
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.465
The court agreed that Abu-Shawish had credibility problems but concluded that he
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he had no specific intent to defraud
the City.466 The court found that Donovan’s Milwaukee Alliance general
redevelopment plan for Muskego Avenue and Abu-Shawish’s more limited project for
456 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 13.
457 Id. at 14.
458 Id.
459 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *18.
460 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 18.
461 Id. at 14.
462 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *19–20.
463 Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to a Certificate of Innocence at 10, United
States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017); see also Abu-Shawish,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *25.
464 See Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *24.
465 Id. at *7–8, *23–25, *28, *37.
466 Id. at *27, *34; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 19.
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an Arab-American-centered redevelopment of a portion of the street blurred, resulting
in confusion about their purposes, personnel, and specific role of Roth and his
report.467 Judge Joseph credited Abu-Shawish’s testimony that he thought Roth was
providing research for the Arabian Fest plan, and that he did not know that Roth was
writing a report for Milwaukee Alliance.468
The court recognized that a comparison of the Roth report and Abu-Shawish report
shows them to be very similar, but the court did not regard that similarity as proof of
intent.469 Instead, the court concluded that there was no evidence that Abu-Shawish
knew of Roth’s report or had seen the first draft of it which referred extensively to the
Milwaukee Alliance.470 Instead, the court credited Defilippo’s testimony that she
made changes to the Roth report at Donovan’s direction before providing a copy to
Abu-Shawish.471 Indeed, the 35-page Roth report was cut to a smaller document, and
FBI searches of Abu-Shawish’s residence did not uncover the original Roth report.472
The court observed that the City grant did not actually require Abu-Shawish
himself to write the plan.473 Even if the plan did not have much value given the
separate submission of the Roth plan, Abu-Shawish and his subordinates did business
development, neighborhood improvement, and data compilation work that added
value to the report, leading the court to conclude that the City was not defrauded.474
In any event, the court concluded that Abu-Shawish reasonably believed that
Sanfilippo’s work product was the result of a “collective plan” of several people,
including himself, and not the sole product of Roth.475
The court found that Abu-Shawish “did not subjectively realize that he was not
supposed to use the report that [Sanfilippo] gave him and present it as a product of
Arabian Fest.”476 The court did not resort to “room” thinking. It did not focus its
attention solely on the inculpatory facts. The opinion instead reflects a careful and
balanced weighing of difficult facts. A “room thinking” approach would be easier.
Abu-Shawish’s credibility issues, the substantial similarity in the reports, his frequent
contact with Roth, and receipt of a draft report that oddly omitted any mention of
Arabian Fest create room for the possibility of guilt. The court did not ignore those

467 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *26–27, *32–33; Abu-Shawish R. & R.,
supra note 436, at 20–21.
468 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 22.
469 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *28.
470 Id. at *36.
471 Id. at *27; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 23.
472 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *27, *31; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra
note 436, at 22–23.
473 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *28.
474 Id. at *29; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, 25–26.
475 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *35–36.
476 Id. at *34–35.
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issues, but it did not solely focus on them either. Nor did it simply accept AbuShawish’s story without question. Instead, it placed reliance on the credible testimony
of third parties and carefully weighed the competing evidence and inferences, mindful
of the preponderance standard.
D.

Prong 3

In Abu-Shawish, the government did not make a Prong 3 argument.477 But, it might
have argued that Abu-Shawish’s behavior was something like Graham’s. He
understood that he was to provide the City a report. Submitting a proposal in
connection with a government grant is a big deal. Presumably, one would want the
proposal to be very compelling so that the City would be inclined to implement it. At
worst, one might worry that if the report were terrible, the city might ask questions
about why it provided a grant for it. Submitting the grant-required report requires care
and attention.
However, the government might argue that Abu-Shawish made only a few small
technical changes to it. Had he studied it with the care and attention it deserved, and
asked questions like why there was no mention of Arabian Fest, he might have come
to see the similarity between it and the Roth report. The government would argue that
was at least neglect. His submission of a seemingly plagiarized report certainly caused
his prosecution.
Had that argument been made, Abu-Shawish would be lucky he was litigating in
the Seventh Circuit where Betts would be binding precedent. His behavior was not
among those on the Borchard list. The court would not want to make moral judgments
about Abu-Shawish’s conduct, and even if it did, the disqualifying misconduct must
be separate and apart from the alleged crime, which this was not. If this case arose in
the Fourth Circuit, where Graham was decided, it is not hard to imagine the issue
being decided the other way.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
One imagines that Edwin Borchard would today be delighted that there is a
National Registry of Exonerations, that thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
have wrongful conviction compensation statutes, and that the reality of wrongful
convictions and need for exonerees to be compensated is accepted in general principle,
if not always in specific practice. He would likely be shocked that over $728 million
has been paid to exonerees in state statutory compensation since 1989.478 He would
wonder why it was that 177 people on the National Registry who sought state
compensation were denied.479 And, he would also be disappointed that his federal
wrongful compensation statute is rarely used and seldom successful. If he and his
statutory editor Homer Cummings were to revisit the statute, what would they do?
Borchard and Cummings would see that there are still doubters – legislators
worried that the undeserving would get paid. They would see that their essential task
remains – to draft a statute that results in compensation for all the deserving and none
477 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2007); Abu-Shawish R. & R.,
supra note 436, at 17.
478 Data on file with author.
479 Data on file with author.
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of those who are not. They would understand that it is not realistic to anticipate all the
hard cases which make that task impossible. Then, the question is where the burden
of error should fall – on the state paying a small number of those regarded as
undeserving, or on the deserving but uncompensated exoneree?
Borchard and Cummings did not have the benefit of history to answer that
question. But, we do. The number of state wrongful conviction compensation statutes
is growing, and some are being liberalized without substantial concern that they have
gone too far by compensating the “undeserving.” It is true that a small number have
imposed modest additional restrictions.480 However, those amendments have been in
states with very generous and well-utilized statutes and have trimmed the
compensatory formula. They have not been reactions to documented cases of the
“undeserving” receiving compensation.
With that context, they would start with the fundamental notion that the essential
characteristic that defines the deserving is innocence. So long as a conviction were set
aside, it should not matter why. Barriers erected to prevent the opportunity to show
innocence result in cases like that of Maria Hernandez. Those should be taken down.
As a result, Prong 1 should simply require that:
(1) The petitioner’s conviction has been reversed or set aside, or on new trial
or rehearing, the petitioner was found not guilty of such offense as appears
from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such
conviction.
Nothing is gained by requiring that the conviction be reversed “on grounds that the
petitioner is not guilty.” The plaintiff still needs to demonstrate innocence, leaving no
possibility that someone regarded as undeserving would be compensated solely
because they surmounted Prong 1. Most state statutes understand this and do not have
the federal Prong 1 requirement,481 or they modify it.482 For example, Alabama

480 See Gutman, supra note 3, at 401.
481 The more recent state statutes do not impose limitations of the grounds of reversal. See
IND. CODE § 5-2-23-1 (2020) (stating the statute applies to a person “whose conviction is
vacated, reversed, or set aside”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018) (valid when “the claimant’s
judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the charges were dismissed or on
retrial the claimant was found to be not guilty”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1755 (2017) (“The
plaintiff's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the charges were dismissed
or the plaintiff was determined on retrial to be not guilty. . . .”). Nevada’s offers a variation.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019) (“The person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
. . . [t]he judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and the charging document was
dismissed.”). States that retain a formulation similar to that in Section 2513(a) include: District
of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2017); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-B1 (2016); and
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2003).
482 In Texas, for example, “wrongfully imprisoned person” includes someone who has been
granted a writ of habeas corpus based on a court finding the person is actually innocent or if the
state’s attorney believes defendant is actually innocent or has no inculpatory evidence. TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.101 (West 2011). Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013),
requires that the conviction be reversed or vacated on the grounds of “significant new
exculpatory information.”
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permits the reversal be on grounds consistent with innocence483 or, even better,
Mississippi requires that it be reversed on grounds not inconsistent with innocence.484
Thus, there is no reason to think that amending the federal statute in this way will have
unintended consequences.
The Prong 2(A) requirement, unexplained in the federal statute’s legislative
history, that the plaintiff prove that they did not “commit any of the acts charged,”
allows courts in cases like Mills to deny petitions for certificates of innocence to those
who commit innocent acts that, separately or together, do not constitute crimes.
Especially if a misconduct bar is retained, there is no obvious benefit to the provision.
Courts have thus pushed back at the resulting unfairness by misreading the language
of the statute in such a way to adopt Cummings’ preference that plaintiffs demonstrate
innocence of crimes, not acts. It is better to fix the statute than misinterpret it.
Parallel state wrongful conviction compensation statutes use terms like “crime,”
“act,” or “offense” to define the thing a plaintiff must be innocent of.485 Indeed, a
small number of states tweak to various degrees the requirement of a showing of
innocence.486 There is no apparent evidence that these formulations have resulted in
compensation to the undeserving. Only three states use the term “acts,” and require

483 Alabama, ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (2020). Minnesota defines “consistent with innocence”
as either “exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based of factual innocence”
or “exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was
ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of
investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.”). MINN. STAT. § 590.11 (2019).
484 Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009). Massachusetts uses an unfortunate
formulation that the grounds of reversal “tend to establish the innocence of the individual.”
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 1 (2018).
485 See, e.g., Florida, FLA. STAT. § 961.02 (2017) (act or offense); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 661-B1 (2016) (crimes); Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014) (“offenses”); Indiana,
IND. CODE § 5-2-23-2 (2020) (offense or criminal act); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004
(2018) (crime or crimes); Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009) (felony or felonies);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2012) (charge or charges); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 501.101 (West 2011) (crime); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013) (illegal
conduct).
486 Colorado, for example, requires a showing of actual innocence, but defines it as including
findings that “his or her conviction was the result of a miscarriage of justice” and that “he or
she presented reliable evidence that he or she was factually innocent.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 1365-101(I)(a)(I), (II) (2018). Ohio includes in the definition of a “wrongfully imprisoned
individual” those who after sentencing or during or after imprisonment found a Brady violation
which resulted in their release. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).
Connecticut perhaps goes the furthest in dispensing with the innocence requirement altogether.
In Connecticut, a person may show eligibility for compensation if their conviction was vacated
or reversed “on grounds of innocence,” or on a ground “citing an act or omission that constitutes
malfeasance or other serious misconduct” by a state agent. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu
(2020). Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11 (2020), requires those who seek a writ of actual
innocence to allege factual innocence, but that appears to require only that newly discovered
evidence, when combined with the existing record, “will prove that no rational trier of fact
would have found proof of guilt or delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt”.
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the plaintiff to demonstrate innocence of each constituent element of a crime that is
not a status.487
Thus, alternative redrafts of Prong 2(A) should make clear the burden of proof,
and would require that the plaintiff allege and prove:
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner did not commit the
crime or crimes for which they were convicted;”488
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner did not engage in the
illegal conduct for which they were convicted;”489
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is innocent of the
crime or crimes for which they were convicted;”490 or,
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is innocent of the
crime or crimes for which they were convicted because no crime was
committed, or the crime was not committed by the petitioner.”491
The burden still rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate innocence, and caselaw makes
it clear that the reversal of the conviction alone is not enough to establish innocence.492
It is important to include the burden of proof in the statute as an express legislative
charge against “room thinking.” The standard, and preferably the legislative history
of the amendment, should remind courts that it is not the obligation of plaintiffs to
demonstrate that they are “altogether” or “truly” innocent of the crime for which they
were wrongly convicted if “altogether” or “truly” means that the record must leave no
evidentiary doubt of their innocence.
Borchard might rewrite Prong 2(B) in a way somewhat narrower that he originally
conceived of it. He would demand that plaintiff also show that his conduct related to
the crime for which the plaintiff was wrongly convicted did not constitute any
uncharged crimes. If federal prosecutors make accurate and comprehensive charging

487 See D.C. CODE § 2-422(a)(4) (2017) (using language very close to the federal statute);
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900(2)(b) (2019) (stating plaintiff must show that he or she did
“not commit the acts that were the basis of the conviction”); New York, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT LAW
§ 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2020) (stating plaintiff must prove “he did not commit any of the acts
charged”).
488 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-23-2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 572:8 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 1 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-9-404 (West 2012).
489 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(a) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013).
490 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603 (2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (2019).
491 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2020); IOWA CODE § 822.2 (2020); MISS. CODE. ANN.
§ 11-44-7 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).
492 See Wrongful Conviction, supra note 142. It should not be necessary to include this caveat
in the statute, but some state compensation statutes have. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-101
(2018).
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decisions (which did not occur in Abu- Shawish), it should not be necessary to require
the plaintiff to prove that their conduct did not violate any uncharged federal
crimes.493 But, Borchard’s conception of the deserving would argue in favor of a
requirement that they disprove any similar state crimes that could have been charged
by local district attorneys. Thus, Prong 2(B) might read:
“by a preponderance of the evidence, petitioner did not commit the crime or
crimes charged and his or her acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with
such charge constituted no offense against the relevant494 State, or Territory,
including the District of Columbia.”
At the same time, there is something uncomfortable about requiring the plaintiff
to prove their innocence of uncharged crimes. What crimes? This could be resolved in
the ordinary course of litigation if the government files a pre-trial motion for summary
judgment. Presumably, if the government believes there was a Prong 2(B) issue, that
motion would identify the potential uncharged crime(s) and offer an explanation as to
why the plaintiff’s conduct stood in violation of it or them.
Otherwise, a variation of the burden shifting concept would call upon the court or
administrative entity to ask the government to identify those uncharged crimes, if any.
Then, the burden would shift to the plaintiff to show that their conduct did not
constitute a violation of them. Hawaii, alone among the states, has an inventive way
of dealing with this problem. In Hawaii, the plaintiff’s commission of other related
crimes is specifically an affirmative defense that the government must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence.495
Prong 3 was not particularly difficult for Borchard or Congress, which essentially
cut and pasted his language into the statute. But, as explained, the examples of
misconduct that Borchard put in the Borchard list, are significantly narrower than the
statute’s broader language otherwise contemplates. That language has been (in
Graham for example) applied to bar compensation in cases beyond those in which the
plaintiff intended to mislead the government as to the perpetrator of the crime.
One option is to get rid of the misconduct bar altogether. After all, by making
Prong 2(A) and 2(B) conjunctive, we are already asking plaintiffs to demonstrate that
their uncharged conduct did not constitute a crime. Thus, the worst form of misconduct
causing the prosecution has been taken care of. The remaining scope of the misconduct
bar disqualifies those whose noncriminal but suspicious or morally dubious behavior
attracted the attention of law enforcement. This requires courts to make difficult
assessments of these acts or omissions and to assess the causal link between them and
493 For this reason, it should not be necessary for state wrongful conviction compensation
statutes to require the plaintiff to demonstrate that their conduct did not constitute any uncharged
state offenses. Even so, a number of state statutes specifically, but varyingly, require the plaintiff
to show that he or she did not commit lesser included offenses, did not conspire to commit the
crime in question, serve as an accessory and/or did not aid and abet those who did. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-65-101 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1755
(2017).
494 I included the word “relevant” to specify that the possible crime be in the same
jurisdiction. If the alleged crime occurred in Iowa, it should not matter that the acts, deeds or
omission would have been a crime in Arkansas if committed there.
495 HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-B1 (2016).
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the prosecution. Many states, without apparent problems, have not included
misconduct bars in their wrongful conviction compensation statutes.496
An alternative would be to hew more closely to the Borchard list and disqualify
those whose act or omissions not only mislead the police, but who intend to do so.
Four states have provisions along these lines, but rather than embodying the list
concept, they use examples of such conduct. Washington’s is a good example:
“claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence to cause or bring
about his or her conviction.”497 The use of the word “to” suggests that the acts were
intended to cause the result. A different formulation that borrows from the cases would
read: “the petitioner did not, by their acts or omissions, intend to mislead law
enforcement authorities as to the actual perpetrator of the crime.”
For some, including Borchard, that is not an entirely satisfactory result because it
does not disqualify someone like Valle or, depending on how you feel about them,
Betts and Graham. A number of state compensation statutes, including several in
which the number of claims filed and granted is quite high, essentially track the
language of Section 2513(b).498 But, relatively few claimants lose on misconduct
grounds. There are three imperfect, alternative ways of dealing with this problem.
The first would be to give the court equitable authority to deal with them. The
provision might read: “in the interests of justice, the court may decline to grant a
certificate of innocence on the ground that the petitioner engaged in acts or omissions,
not to include a guilty plea or coerced confession, that caused their conviction.” Such
open-ended discretion can solve the Valle problem, but runs the potential risk of use
against others, like Gates, regarded as more deserving.
The second would be to give the Court of Federal Claims authority, in the interests
of justice, to decline to award the full $50,000 per year amount. Instead, they would
be called upon to make a judgment as to the nature, severity, and causal connection
between the act or omission and the conviction. This would not be a comparative
negligence sort of calculation499 because the court would not compare the relative
faults of the claimant and the government. In many wrongful conviction cases, there
is no demonstrable fault of the government.

496 ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2020); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-102uu (2020); IND. CODE § 5-2-23-1 (2020); IOWA CODE §822.2 (2020); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 15:572.8 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &
PROC. § 10-501 (West 2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1214 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2020); OHIO
REV. CODE § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2020); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-27-109 (2020); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (West 2020); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404 (West 2020).
497 See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2020); see also MINN. STAT. § 590.11 (2020); MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603 (2020). Vermont’s statute does not
include an intent requirement. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(a) (2020).
498 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2020); D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 605004 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2020); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT LAW § 8-b(5)(c)
(McKinney 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-327.11 (2020).
499 Adam I. Kaplan, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 256 (2008).
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The third is to look not at past misconduct, but to future behavior as many state
statutes do.500 Here, the $50,000 per year award would be paid in installments over
time, rather than on a lump sum basis. Continued receipt of those installments would
be conditioned on the recipient not being convicted of any future crime. Installment
payments impose a measure of financial discipline on prevailing plaintiffs, and a
future misconduct bar provides an incentive to avoid future criminal activity.
These statutory amendments and recommended approaches to implementing the
preponderance of the evidence standard will result in a statute that is truer to
Borchard’s vision and Cummings’ draftsmanship. They would better meet the drafting
challenge that these compensation statutes present by permitting more exonerees an
opportunity to present their substantive claims of innocence and creating a more
balanced way of evaluating those claims through a burden shifting methodology. The
result will not be revolutionary, but calls for substantially more liberal statutes are
unlikely to gain considerable legislative traction in the budgetary environments we are
likely to see in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, these reforms may bend the arc
of justice a bit further in favor of those who so badly need it.

500 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-3-114(7)(b) (2020);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.154(a) (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9405(3)(b) (West 2020) (payments tolled during incarceration for subsequent felony).
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